The impact of the new public management reforms on political control and corruption : the case of Malawi's Local Governance by Tambulasi, Richard Ignitious Chipopopo
                                                                                
 
UNIVERSITY OF STELLENBOSCH   
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REFORMS 
ON 
POLITICAL CONTROL AND CORRUPTION: THE CASE OF 
MALAWI’S LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard Ignitious Chipopopo Tambulasi 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Public Administration at the University of Stellenbosch 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Professor A.P.J. Burger  
 
 
 
Date: December 2005 
DECLARATION   
 
 
 
 
 
I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is 
my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirely or in part 
submitted it at any university for a degree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        
   Signature: ……………………………..             Date: 14 July 2005









&RS\ULJKW8QLYHUVLW\RI6WHOOHQERVFK
$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii
 ABSTRACT 
 
The new public management (NPM) paradigm features very highly in both contemporary 
public sector reform and public sector management literature. The NPM model has been 
implemented both in the developing and developed world at the local and central levels 
of government. Key to NPM is the introduction of market principles in the running of the 
public sector. The rationale is to replace the over rigid and bureaucratic traditional public 
administration with the fast moving form of public management so as to achieve high 
levels of efficiency, effectiveness and economy in the delivery of public goods and 
services.    
 
Despite its wide application, the doctrine of NPM has had diverse impacts in different 
countries. In some countries it has proved a success while in others it has simply not 
worked. In certain cases, the application of the NPM model has resulted into undesirable 
consequences.  Key to these are the loss of political control and an increase in the levels 
of corruption.  These impacts, especially the effects on corruption are even higher in 
cases when the NPM has been applied in ‘soft states’ (a general category of states to 
which most of the third world countries belong). This is the case as these countries have 
low social discipline and lack the capacity and institutions to adequately address 
problems of accountability that arise with the NPM.  
 
This study examines the impact of the NPM on political control and corruption at the 
Malawian Local Government level. The study has found that the NPM has led to loss of 
local political control and has increased the opportunities for corruption. Malawi being a 
‘soft state’ the study has observed that the impact of NPM on corruption have been 
massive. To address these problems the study recommends the implementation of the 
Public Governance model. The rationale is that the Public Governance model has built in 
mechanisms that can adequately mitigate the impact of NPM on political control and 
corruption. 
 
The study is mainly based on qualitative data collected in the three sampled local 
government assemblies in Malawi. These include:  Salima Town Assembly, Mzuzu City 
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Assembly, and   Zomba Municipal Assembly.   Data was mainly collected through 
personal interviews with Assembly Managers and Councillors. In addition, the study also 
relied on a review of various government literature providing insights to the subject under 
study.   
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OPSOMMING 
 
 
Die paradigma van nuwe openbare bestuur (NOB) speel ’n groot rol in hedendaagse 
literatuur rakende die hervorming en bestuur van die openbare sektor. Die NOB-model is 
in sowel die ontwikkelende as die ontwikkelde wêreld op plaaslike en sentrale 
regeringsvlakke geïmplementeer. Sentraal tot NOB is die instelling van markbeginsels in 
die bestuur van die openbare sektor. Die grondrede is om die uiters rigiede en 
burokratiese tradisionele openbare administrasie met die vinnig bewegende vorm van 
openbare bestuur te vervang om sodoende hoë vlakke van doeltreffendheid en besparing 
in die lewering van kollektiewe goedere en dienste te behaal.     
 
Ten spyte van die breë toepassing daarvan het die impak van die NOB-leer van land tot 
land gewissel. In sommige lande was dit ’n sukses, maar in ander het dit bloot nie gewerk 
nie. In sekere gevalle het die toepassing van die NOB-model ongewenste gevolge gehad, 
hoofsaaklik die verlies van politieke beheer en ’n toename in die vlak van korrupsie. 
Hierdie impak, veral die gevolge vir korrupsie, is selfs hoër in gevalle waar NOB in 
‘sagte state’ toegepas is (’n algemene kategorie state waaronder die meeste 
Derdewêreldlande ressorteer). Die rede hiervoor is dat hierdie lande oor lae maatskaplike 
dissipline beskik en die kapasiteit en instansies ontbreek om die probleme met 
toerekenbaarheid wat met NOB ontstaan, voldoende te hanteer.   
 
Hierdie studie ondersoek die impak van NOB op politieke beheer en korrupsie op 
plaaslike regeringsvlak in Malawi. Die studie het bevind dat NOB verlies aan plaaslike 
politieke beheer en toename in geleenthede vir korrupsie tot gevolg gehad het. Die studie 
het waargeneem dat NOB ’n groot impak op korrupsie in Malawi, ’n ‘sagte staat’, gehad 
het. Om hierdie probleme te oorbrug, beveel die studie die implementering van die 
openbarebestuursmodel aan. Die grondrede is dat die openbarebestuursmodel ingeboude 
meganismes het wat die impak van NOB op politieke beheer en korrupsie genoegsaam 
kan temper.  
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Die studie is hoofsaaklik gebaseer op kwalitatiewe data wat by drie vergaderings van die 
plaaslike regering in Malawi, naamlik die Salima dorpsvergadering, die Mzuzu 
stadsvergadering, en die Zomba munisipale vergadering, ingesamel is. Data is 
hoofsaaklik deur middel van persoonlike onderhoude met die bestuurders van die 
vergaderings en raadslede ingesamel. Vir verdere insig oor die studie-onderwerp het die 
studie ook op ’n oorsig van ’n verskeidenheid regeringsliteratuur gesteun.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION  
 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
  
This chapter introduces the thesis. It is organised into seven main sections. The first section 
introduces this thesis and the second presents the background to the study.   The rationale for 
the study is presented in part three while objectives of the study come in section four. Section 
five brings forth the working hypothesis of the study. The outline of subsequent chapters is 
given in the last section.   
 
1.2.  BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY  
 
Malawi became a multi-party democracy in 1994 under the United Democratic Front (UDF) 
party leadership after thirty years of autocratic and single party rule of the Malawi Congress 
Party (MCP). In order to create a viable and vibrant civil service that would   be used to deal 
with the challenges of the new dispensation, namely; poverty alleviation, and the 
achievement and sustainability of democratic and good governance policy outcomes, the new 
government implemented a lot of public sector reforms with the support of various donor 
partners.  The reforms were enshrined in the Civil Service Action Plan of 1996 and included 
the following: institutional rationalisation and realignment with policy and legislative 
framework; re-organization of ministries (functional reviews) to create autonomous agencies 
(authorities); viable human resource management practices; conditions of service; 
performance contracts scheme; privatisation; outcome based budget and financial 
management systems; decentralization; outsourcing/contracting out; user fees; information 
communication technology; and economic management (Malawi Government, 1996).  
 
Although the reform initiative bundle was called ‘Public Sector Management Reform 
Programme’ (PSMRP) (Kamanga, 2002), it can be seen from the above stated reforms that 
these were typical New Public Management reforms. Despite the fact that the 
decentralisation reform initiatives are seen as a separate element, the rest of the reforms have 
also been implemented within the decentralised governance structures. In this regard, Malawi 
adopted the Decentralisation Policy in October 1998. The Policy provides for the 
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establishment of Local Governments as the basis and a framework for the devolution of 
functions, responsibilities, powers and resources to District Assemblies (Malawi 
Government, 1998a). The Decentralisation Policy was followed by the Local Government 
Act enacted in December 1998 to create the legal framework for decentralised governance in 
Malawi. According to the Local Government Act 1998, the objectives of local government 
shall be “to further the constitutional order based on democratic principles, accountability, 
transparency and participation of the people in decision-making and development process” 
(Malawi Government, 1998b). 
Each local government authority constitutes an assembly. According to the Local 
Government Act 1998 there are four different types of assemblies in Malawi. These include: 
District Assemblies, City Assemblies, Municipal Assembly and Town Assemblies. These 
local government assemblies became functional following the local elections in 2000. They 
are composed of the political wing (councillors) and the administrative wing as stipulated in 
the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi of 1995 section 147 (1 – 2) as follows:  
1. Local government officers (the political wing) who shall be elected by free, secret and 
equal suffrage by the registered voters in the area over which that local government 
authority is to have jurisdiction. 
2. Administrative personnel (the administrative wing), subordinate to local government 
officers (the political wing) to execute and administer the lawful resolutions and 
policies of those officers  
 
The administrative wing is headed by a District Commissioner in the case of District and 
Municipal assemblies, and a Chief Executive in the case of City and Town assemblies.  
Below this are Directors of different departments including Finance, Administration, and 
Planning and Development. All these positions are contract based and together they form a 
formidable team to run the day-to day administrative activities and implement public policy 
at the local level. The political side is headed by a Mayor in the case of City and Municipal 
assemblies and a Chairperson in the case of District and Town Assemblies.  These are elected 
by and among councillors. The political wing is responsible for the formulation of policies 
and receives reports from the managers on the results and outcomes of such policies. It is 
elected every five years.  
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1.2. RATIONALE/ STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
The New Public Management paradigm (hereafter NPM) has been implemented in many 
countries both at the “central and local levels of the public sector” (Siverbo, 2003:3) to the 
extent that it has been said to be a “global” (Hughes, 1998:58); an “inevitable” (Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1992:325); a “public management for all seasons” (Hood, 1991); and an “example 
of globalisation at work” (United Nations, 2001:36).  Despite this massive publicity, the 
doctrine of NPM has had diverse impacts in different countries. In some countries it has 
proved a success while other countries it has simply not worked. Despite warnings for its 
inapplicability and undesirable consequences in developing countries (Minogue, 2000; 
Polidano et al, 1998 and Huque, 2004), many of these countries have gone on to implement 
them with the insistence of the donor institutions notably, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. Malawi is not an exception. The implementation of the NPM 
reforms (stated in the previous section) at the local level, although seemingly successful, has 
had different unfavourable consequences which have not been critically examined and 
addressed.  The main issues in question are concerns that the NPM reforms have led to the 
loss of local political control and have increased local opportunities for corruption. These 
undesirable consequences are in turn feared to impact negatively on public policy outcomes.  
 
Although both the Constitution and the Local Government Act clearly stipulate the 
demarcation of powers between the political and administrative wings of the local 
governance (inline with the NPM dictates), there are conflicts and rivalry relationship 
between them. Most of these conflicts point to the tactics of regaining control and power that 
the political wing thinks it is losing as it has to keep away from policy implementation.  On 
the other side, the administrative wing is not comfortable with the constant intrusions of 
politicians in service delivery and policy implementation. To illustrate, at Lilongwe City 
Assembly the political wing accused the Chief Executive Officer (management wing) of 
being a “dictator in the way he runs the assembly” (The Nation, 2003a) and demanded not to 
renew his contract. The real reason for being labelled ‘dictator’ was that the Chief Executive 
Officer could not allow any political intrusion into policy implementation. Meanwhile, some 
councillors have been intervening in policy implementation by “forcing employees 
(administrative wing) to flout procedures and award them contracts” (The Nation, 2003b).   
Despite the fact that decentralisation (and NPM in general) in Malawi is to foster 
accountability, transparency and good governance at local level (Malawi Government 1996; 
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Malawi Government, 1998a), there have been queries that NPM elements including 
decentralisation itself, have created an unhealthy breeding ground for corruption. Notable 
examples in this regard include the case where the Mangochi Town Assembly Chairman (of 
the political wing) and his deputy were convicted of participating in a tender process and 
corruptly awarding themselves a contract to the tune of MK6.5 million1  (The Nation, 
2003c). It must be noted that this case also hinges on the tactics to gain political control as 
awarding contracts is a policy implementation issue which was supposed to be under the 
realm of the administration wing. In addition, the Blantyre City Mayor has many times been 
“accused of abusing and draining the Assembly’s coffers” (Malawi News, 2003). The 
administrative wing is not without blame. It has been involved in NPM related corruption 
issues including asking contractors for bribes, extortion, getting kickbacks and self-
enrichment. For instance the Director of Planning and Development, and the Building 
Supervisor of Chitipa District Assembly were arrested on corruption charges which involved 
asking for bribes to award contracts where they told the contractors that “the 
contracts were not given to them on a silver platter but that they should at least do something 
as a return favour,” (Nation Online, 2004a). They were also accused of using privileged 
contract information in favour of a relative. Another case in point is that of the Kasungu 
District Commissioner and the Director of Finance found guilty of corruption and 
misappropriation of Assembly money amounting to MK3.6 million (Nation Online, 2004b).   
 
With all these revelations and insights of NPM reforms leading to reduced local political 
control and creating more openings and opportunities for corruption, one can predict the 
devastating implications on public policy outcomes.  However, there has been no 
comprehensive study conducted to assess the impact of NPM reforms on local political 
control and corruption in Malawi’s local government. This study therefore intends to fill the 
knowledge gap. In this regard, the study will highlight challenges that the implementation of 
NPM reforms is experiencing in terms of political control and corruption in Malawi’s Local 
Governance. This will help to fill the knowledge vacuum and give public sector reformers 
renewed insights in the implementation of the reform programs.   
 
 
 
                                                 
1 MK=Malawi Kwacha. Kwacha is Malawi’s currency. As of 17th January 2005, MK15.94 = R 1 (R=South 
African Rand).  Source: Standard Bank Exchange Rates, 17th January 2005  
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1.4.     OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
The study has general and specific objectives as follows:  
 
 
1.4.1 GENERAL OBJECTIVES 
 
 
The general objective of this study is to critically examine and evaluate the extent to which 
the New Public Management reforms that are being implemented in Malawi’s Local 
Government erode local political control and foster corruption.  
 
1.4.2     SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES  
 
The specific objectives of this study are as follows: 
• To provide a broader understanding of the New Public Management reforms 
• To provide both a critical and objective analysis of the rationale and possible 
unintended consequences of the NPM paradigm 
• To explore how the NPM reforms are being implemented in Malawi’s Local 
Government  
• To explore the challenges being encounter in terms of political control and corruption 
in the implementation of the NPM reforms in Malawi  
• To explore measures that can be put in place to avert and minimise the impact of the 
unintended consequences of NPM  
 
 
1.5.      RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
 
The working hypothesis of this study is: 
 
      New Public Management reforms result in reduced political control and foster 
      corruption. 
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1.6.     OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
 
This study has six chapters. Chapter one introduces the study. It has the following 
subsections:  background to the study; problem statement; objectives of the study consisting 
of general and specific objectives; research hypothesis; limitations to the study; and chapter 
outline.  
  
Chapter two consists of the literature review. It has two main subsections. The first 
subsection discusses public sector reforms while the second looks at public reforms packages 
that are frequently applied and problems associated with them. Two main reform 
prescriptions will be explored namely; the New Public Management and the Public 
Governance model.  
 
 
Chapter three presents public sector reforms in Malawi. It looks at both what the study 
classifies as first generation reforms and second generation reforms.  
  
Chapter four contains the study’s operational instruments. It brings fourth the methods that 
were used to carry out this study and a profile of the sampled local government assemblies. It 
also presents the study design and data analysis procedure.  
 
  
Chapter five provides the findings of this study. It particularly focuses on the working 
relations between councillors and local government managers in the light of NPM which 
point to reduced local political control and instances of corruption that relate to NPM.  
 
 
Chapter six brings fourth recommendations and concludes the study.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1.     INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter presents a literature review. It brings forth theoretical concepts regarding public 
sector reforms.  It has four main sections. Section One explores public sector reforms, and 
the second section looks at what specific reform packages are proposed. Section Two is 
further divided into two main subsections: the first sub-section discusses the New Public 
Management (NPM) paradigm. Within this sub-heading, are the rationale of the NPM, and 
dysfunctional consequences of the NPM which include loss in political control and 
corruption. The second subsection looks at the Public Governance model. The rationale of 
the Public Governance paradigm and problems which the Public Governance model has 
encountered are also discussed in this subsection.  
 
2.2.  PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM 
 
Public sector reform is a common occurrence in many countries to the extent that it has 
“become one of those things that no government can do without” (Lane, 2001:12).  It refers 
to the “induced systematic improvement of public sector operational performance” (Caiden, 
1991:1). In the same regard, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000:8) describe it as “deliberate changes 
to the structures and processes of public sector organisations with the objective of getting 
them (in some sense) to run better”.  
 
Reforms aim to “improve the effectiveness and performance of the civil service to ensure its 
affordability and sustainability… (so as)… to raise the quality of public services delivered to 
the population and to enhance the capacity to carry out core government functions” (Wescott, 
1999:2).  The reasoning is that there are some problems with the running of public affairs and 
public sector reform “presupposes the solution” (Batley and Larbi, 2004: 39-40). It is 
suggested that these problems arise due to the use of the traditional public administration 
based on Max Weber’s rational/legal bureaucracy. It is in this respect that many authors 
agree that the primary drive for public sector reforms was to change the traditional public 
administration (Hughes, 1998; Caiden, 1991; Caiden 2001; Batley and Larbi, 2004; Ferlie et 
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al 1996; and Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000: 58-59).  In fact “the arguments for limiting the role 
of the state were in essence against traditional public administration” (Batley and Larbi, 
2004:39).  
 
Although at time of Max Weber the traditional public administration was considered as “the 
one best way of administering”, (Hughes, 1998:38) and it “meant something positive” 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992:12), in recent times it has been seen to be “in need of 
replacement by more flexible, fast moving performance oriented forms of modern 
organisation” (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000:59). This is the case as it has been seen to be “rigid 
and bureaucratic, narrowly focused and preoccupied with structure” (Hughes 1998:38) and 
therefore it “no longer worked very well” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992:12). 
 
In particular, governments that used it became over bloated; “suffered from 
bureaupathologies characterised by waste, inflexibility, impenetrability of hierarchy, the 
rigidity of dense internal rules and unresponsiveness to service users” (Batley and Larbi, 
2004: 39); and they simply “do not function well in the (present) changing, information-rich, 
knowledge-intensive society and economy” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992:12). Hughes 
(1998:39), comments that bureaucracy was ideal for control but not for management; allowed 
for certainty but was slow in moving; standardised work but at the cost of innovation; and 
political control could not assure genuine accountability. Therefore the “dead hand of 
bureaucracy has to be replaced by a new invigorating concept of public management and 
clear proof that public organisations are value for money” (Caiden, 2001: 655-656). 
  
The problems with the traditional bureaucracy have been precipitated by some “winds of 
change … (which have) been recognised as demanding radical alterations in the way public 
business was being conducted” (Caiden, 1991:1).  Pollitt and Bouckaert, (2000:26) classified 
these ‘winds of change’ as social-economic, political and administrative forces as depicted in 
figure 2.1 below: 
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Figure 2.1: Forces For Reform 
 
 
 
Source: Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000:26. 
 
 
It must be noted however that although public sector reforms are meant to improve the public 
service, unintended results are a normal phenomenon. Public sector reforms may yield “bad 
results” including a “deterioration rather an improvement in performance” (Boyne, Farrell, 
Law, Powell and Walker, 2003:4).  This is mostly the case as public sector reform “realities 
may be a quite different matter, as there tend to be huge distance between lofty theory and 
down-to-earth practice” (Lane, 2001:1). Moreover the absence of intense social conflicts; the 
presence of resources, technology and enterprise, and high intolerance for maladministration 
which are the necessary prerequisites for successful reforms (Caiden, 1991: 47) are not 
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always present in implementing countries rendering the reforms unobtainable. However, 
despite these obstacles and unintended consequences, public sector reforms have not 
diminished in popularity.  
 
2.3.  WHAT REFORM PACKAGES ARE PROPOSED  
 
Although there may be some overlaps, the public sector reform packages can be categorised 
into two main bundles: The new public management paradigm and the public governance 
paradigm.   
 
 
2.4. THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT PARADIGM   
 
The NPM paradigm is a notoriously difficult and slippery concept to pin down. This is the 
case as it has a “number of facets or ingredients and from one country and time to another the 
emphasis may vary between these” (Pollitt, 2003:27). This hinges on the fact that “there is no 
simple convergence on one new public management model, but rather that a range of options 
is available” (Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald and Pettigrew, 1996:20).  In addition different 
authors emphasise on different aspects of the concept calling it different names in the 
process.  For instance, it is called the ‘entrepreneurial government’ by Osborne and Gaebler, 
(1992); Pollitt (1990) calls it ‘managerialism’; Hood (1991) refers to it as ‘new public 
management’; Lan and Rosenbloom (1992) say it is ‘market based public administration’; 
and Kaul (1997) names it ‘new public administration’. What is certain however, is that the 
“label covers all types of public sector reforms and excludes nothing” (Bevir, Rhodes and 
Weller, 2003:2). Although Dunleavy and Margetts, (2000:13) summarises the NPM 
paradigm as “disaggregation + competition + incentivization”, we can identify its “doctrinal 
elements” (Hood, 1991:5) as follows:   
 
The first element is the implementation of hands-on professional management in the public 
sector. This means “active, visible discretionary control of organisations from named persons 
at the top, free to manage since accountability requires clear assignment of responsibility for 
action” (Hood, 1991:4). This is highlighted by the NPM movement’s slogan: “let the 
managers manage” and “management is management” (United Nations, 2001:37). According 
to Hughes (1998:61), this implies that managers would themselves be responsible for the 
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achievement of results rather than being an administrator, following someone’s (politicians) 
directives.  
 
The second aspect is the adoption of output or result oriented public service management.  
This entails a shift in the focus of management from inputs and process towards outputs and 
outcomes (Pollitt, 2003:27). In this regard, resource allocation and rewards are linked to 
measured performance (Hood, 1991:4). In terms of budgeting, the performance and 
programme budgeting systems that looks at “outputs rather than inputs” (Kaul, 1997:23) 
replace the older line item budgeting (Hughes, 1998: 64) and links performance information 
with budgets (United Nations, 2001:40). This makes managers to be accountable to 
politicians for results and outcomes rather than inputs and processes.  
 
Thirdly, for output based public service to materialise, there is need for the adoption of 
explicit standards and measures of performance. According to Hood (1991:4), this entails the 
definition of goals, targets and indicators of success. The argument is that performance 
management would ensure managerial autonomy so that managers work to their best; address 
problems of accountability (United Nations Economic Council for Africa, 2003:14); and 
regulate the activities of public managers (Minogue, 1998:142).  Performance measurements 
also entail the development of citizen charters which set out the standard of service which the 
public has the right to receive and offer some regress for failure to achieve that standard 
(Hollis and Plokker, 1995:45). In this regards, citizens are no longer considered as “passive 
recipients of services but active customers” (Kaul, 1997:15).  
 
Fourthly, NPM stresses on the practice of private sector styles of management in the public 
service. The argument is that the private sector is efficient because it uses market principles 
and therefore to make government more efficient we need to use the same. The assumption is 
that running government is like running Marks and Spencer (private business) either in 
content and execution (Rayner cited in Metcalfe and Richards, 1990:156). In this regard 
NPM stresses on greater flexibility and autonomy in hiring and rewards, and use of ‘proven’ 
private sector management tools (Hood, 1991:5) which include customer service where 
citizens are regarded as ‘customers’ to be served instead of ‘clients’ to be managed (Kettl, 
1997:452). In addition there should be “greater discipline and parsimony in resource use” 
(Hood, 1991:5). This entails, cutting costs, raising productivity, and doing more with less 
(Hood, 1991:5), directing resources to emphasise those programmes which most assist the 
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attainment of strategic goals (Hughes, 1998:65), cost effectiveness, and value for money 
(Kroukamp, 2001:24).  In this regard NPM empowers public officers to be ‘entrepreneurial’ 
(Osborne and Gaebler 1992) and makes them cost conscious and more transparent.    
 
In addition, there must be a move to greater competition in the public sector. This is the case 
as “rivalry is the key to lower costs and better standards” (Hood, 1991:5).  This competition 
is introduced through privatisation, contracting out, the use of public-private-partnerships, 
and the introduction of user fees. Privatisation incorporates deregulation and transferring of 
ownership of assets from the public to the private sector (Metcalfe and Richards, 1990:156-
157) so as to “foster efficiency, encourage investment and free public resources for 
investments in infrastructure and social programmes” (Khandwalla, 1999:128). On the other 
hand, contracting out involves the “out-sourcing or buying in of goods and services from 
external sources instead of providing them in house” (Larbi, 1999:27). The logic is that the 
private sector can carry out such services in a more efficient and cost effective manner than 
the government. Private-public-partnerships involve working arrangements based on “mutual 
commitment (over and above that implied in any contract) between a public sector 
organisation and any organisation outside the public sector” (Bovaird, 2004:200). It entails 
the “broadening and blurring of the frontier between the public and private sectors through 
the creation of hybrid organisations” (Pollitt, 2002:474).  User fees work to supplement 
government revenue and make it more efficient and improve quality (Larbi, 1999:32) 
because users will demand better value for their money. In addition, by providing a way to 
test market demand, user charges assist departments in determining the proper scale of 
delivery and contribute to responsive government (Kroukamp, 2001:30). 
 
NPM also champions the desegregation and decentralisation of units in the public sector. 
This involves the “breaking up of monolithic units, destroying of U-form management 
systems into corporatised units around products, operating on decentralised one line budgets 
and dealing with one another on an ‘arms-length basis’” (Hood, 1991:5). The key is to 
“unbundle” (Ferlie et al, 1996:12), “debureaucratise the public service and delayer 
hierarchies within them” (Larbi, 1999:17); “hiving off central government functions to local 
authorities” (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2003:9)  and “hollow out 
government” (Minogue, 2000: 12). The idea is that the government should have a “smaller 
policy core overseeing flatter, less hierarchical, more fragmented implementing periphery” 
(Minogue, 2000:12). This in turn achieves the distinction between policy and operation 
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functions of government so that governments become “catalytic” and they “steer instead of 
row” (Osborne and Gaebler 1992:25). 
 
Related to the above, NPM is for the separation of owner and purchaser functions of 
government in public service delivery. In this arena, government as the purchaser should be 
given the liberty to purchase from “non departmental sources” (Bale and Dale, 1998:108) and 
even from private providers through a competitive process. Within the provider-purchaser 
split there is the principle of “capital charging” (Bale and Dale, 1998: 110) where the notion 
that government agencies should pay for the cost of capital invested in them, thrives. This 
encourages the responsible use of such items and enables managers request for capital items 
they really need.  
    
2.4.1.  THE RATIONALE OF NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REFORMS 
  
 
Many authors agree that NPM is happening because the old way (traditional bureaucracy) 
does not work under contemporary conditions and therefore governments all over the world 
are mitigating towards a new way of running things (entrepreneurial government) which does 
work (Pollitt, 2002:481-482; Osborn and Gaebler, 1992, Hughes, 1998:54 ff). In this regard, 
Pollitt, (1990:59) contends that NPM aims to achieve the “virtuous three Es’: economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness”. More specifically, Pollitt (2000:165 ff) and de Bruijn (2002) 
observe that NPM reforms are implemented to attain the following results: savings and 
reduced budget appropriations; improved, faster, more accessible processes; improved 
efficiency; greater effectiveness; increase in the overall capacity, flexibility and resilience of 
the administrative system as a whole; and productivity and increased output. Apart from 
these, NPM has been implemented to attain more specific aims and results. For instance in 
the United Kingdom, NPM aimed to create the minimalist state while in Norway it aimed to 
protect the state (Bevir et al, 2003:2).  
 
Generally, the NPM reforms have been trumpeted as both necessary and successful (Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 2000). In their study, Christensen and Laegreid (2004:129) found that public 
manager saw increasing awareness of goals, means and results and making both the control 
and activities of the public service better. However, Pollitt, (2003:38) is suspicious that the 
architects of NPM were “so confident of its benefits that they were content to leave the 
results as matters of faith rather than as issues to be checked and evaluated”.  This is 
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supported by Christensen and Laegreid, (2001:74) who argue that the “effects and 
implications of NPM are often assumed or promised but not well documented”. It is not the 
intention of this study to divulge into this discussion. However, it is sufficient to say that 
NPM has had mixed results. In some instances it has worked up to the reformers’ 
expectations while in others it has proved a failure (Polidano et al, 1998:285).   
  
2.4.2 DYSFUNCTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW PUBLIC 
MANAGEMENT REFORMS  
 
Unintended consequences are not uncommon in the pubic management literature. After all 
every reform and human organisation has the “Achilles’ Heels” (Hood, 1998:28). This study 
is concerned with two NPM dysfunctional consequences namely: loss of political control and 
the creation of a fertile breeding ground for corruption.  
 
 
2.4.2.1     NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND LOSS OF POLITICAL CONTROL 
 
There have been queries that the NPM has led to the loss of political control while increasing 
the power of bureaucrats thereby threatening democratic governance.  
 
The ‘traditional public administration’ gave more power and responsibility to the politicians 
while public officials were only regarded as administrators implementing public policies 
under the strict supervision of politicians. On the other hand, NPM simultaneously promises 
public managers more freedom and politicians more control and public service users more 
choice (Pollitt, 2003:26). The slogan has been “increase political control, free managers to 
manage and empower service consumers” (Ferlie et al, 2000:155). However, the problem 
with this is that NPM promises empowerment to everyone, a thing that is practically 
impossible to achieve. In this regard, Ferlie at al, (2000:155) ask as to “how is it possible to 
give managers greater freedom and yet at the same time place them under the central control 
of ministers (politicians) and oblige them to be more responsive to newly empowered 
consumers?”. The sober reality is that one section has to gain more power over the others. 
Following this, Hood (1998:208) questions that “since not everyone can be empowered at the 
same time, who exactly is to be empowered against whom?”  The answer is that in practice, 
administrators have gained more autonomy while political control has deteriorated.  This is 
the case as “politicians expend little time and energy on the new steering techniques and 
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leave them to a greater extent to the administration leaders, thus in practice transferring 
power and influence to them” (Christensen and Laegreid, 2004:16). Moreover the NPM is 
concerned with the economics rather than the politics of service provision (United Nations, 
2001:38) and it is “anti-politics, with collective choice being replaced with individual 
choice” (McGarvey, 1997:630) thereby “potentially undermining political control” 
(Christensen and Laegreid, 2004:19). In addition, “since the public servant is to be 
managerially accountable, this is seen as detracting from the accountability of a responsible 
politician” (Hughes, 1998:77). This is the case as a “preoccupation with efficiency 
overvalues the need for managerial accountability rather than political responsibility” 
(Christensen and Laegreid, 2001:90) so that “politicians lose control through greater 
administrative and commercial autonomy” (Christensen and Laegreid, 2004:21-22). A more 
recent evidence in this tune is in Norway where politicians agreed that NPM had 
“undermined their political control, something they saw as somewhat problematic, they also 
acknowledged the existence of pressure to use their remaining control instruments in a 
passive and reactive way” (Christensen and Laegreid, 2004: 16).  
 
The whole mark of representative democracy is the election time where voters elect 
politicians who control the public sector (Jorgensen and Bozeman, 2002:67). The loss of 
political control has implications on democratic governance. Managers are given so much 
freedom that there is some erosion of democratic control (Pollitt, 2003:47).  In this regard 
some have argued that with the NPM “democracy is to a large extent by-passed” (McGarvey, 
1997:630) so that “the role of elected members is a minimal one”. In this respect, NPM raises 
“huge challenges for the behaviour of elected officials and for the operation of democracy” 
(Kettl, 1997:457) since “representative democratic mechanisms are being viewed as to a 
large extent flawed in transmitting the electorates’ preferences” (McGarvey, 1997:629-630). 
Due to its exclusive focus on the delivery of service, NPM “defines politics in a very narrow 
manner” (Stoker, 1996:6) thereby “weakening democratic institutions, limiting citizen 
participation in politics and weakening the democratic process” (Farnham and Horton, 1996: 
276). Moreover, there is a tendency to define “political involvement in public enterprises as 
inappropriate interference in business matters” (Christensen and Laegreid, 2004:16) and 
thereby “radically transforms the connections between elected officials and voters… (and 
ultimately) affects the sinews of democracy” (Kettl, 1997:457). It must be noted however 
that NPM ignores the citizen-politician nexus not because it ignores citizen participation but 
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because it ignores the politician – as is natural in a theory drawn from the private sector 
(Frant, 1996:9). 
 
In practice, the loss of political control has brought a rivalry, an “unstable and an ebb-and-
flow” (Christensen and Laegreid, 2004:19) relationship between the politicians and the 
bureaucrats. The politicians have seen NPM is a “self-serving movement designed to 
promote the career interests of an elite group of new managerialists rather than the mass of 
public service customers” (Hood, 1991:9). They consider strong bureaucracy as executive 
attempts to evade legislative areas and usurp their representative function. In this regard, it 
has become particularly difficult and problematic for the political leadership to meet the 
requirement of a rationally planned NPM reform process (Christensen and Laegreid, 
2004:19). On the other hand, the bureaucracy perceives intervention by political executives 
as the intrusion of partisan politics into fields from which politics should be excluded. In this 
regard there is a tendency to define political involvement as “inappropriate interference in 
business matters” (Christensen and Laegreid, 2001:81). They contend that politicians make 
decision without scientific evidence (Ham, Robinson and Hunter, 1995) and political 
decisions are often concerned to lack logic (Schedler, 2003:534).  
 
Politicians however, cannot afford to lose control over the implementation of public policy. 
As a result they employ various strategies to win back their control. More often than not, 
politicians “get their revenge by influencing small-scale daily business” (du Voitel, 1996:6) 
while in other respects they use politicisation, regulation inside government, and specific 
incursion into the managerial space (Hood, 2000:16). They also try to blame the bureaucrats.  
The administrative leaders on the other hand, are “reluctant to accept blame and try to push 
the blame back to the politicians and cover their backs” (Christensen and Laegreid, 2004:20). 
This brings unhealthy confrontation and conflicts in public service delivery.  
 
 
2.4.2.2.   NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND CORRUPTION  
 
The subject of corruption is not short of literature. Generally, corruption involves the illegal 
transfer of public resources from public to private use. It is defined as the “misuse of public 
office for private gains” (Chetwynd, Chetwynd and Spector, 2003:6). Nye captured the 
concept of corruption very well in his historical text when he referred to it as the “behaviour 
which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private regarding (personal, 
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close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of 
certain types of private regarding influence” (Nye, 1967:419). Corruption as an activity 
includes but not limited to embezzlement, nepotism, bribery, extortion, influence pending 
and fraud (Chetwynd et al, 2003:6).   
 
Research on the straight cut cause-effect relationship between NPM and corruption is very 
narrow. In addition, many authors do not establish a direct link between NPM and 
corruption. Common in the available literature is the argument that NPM per se does not 
cause corruption but it provides opportunities for corruption. However some researchers have 
substantiated this with the fact that “it’s the opportunity that makes thieves” (von Maravic 
and Reichard, 2003:124), and consequently, linking corruption directly to NPM reforms. In 
this respect, Haque (2000:608) is concerned that “increased managerial autonomy in public 
governance may expand the avenues for using public office for private gains; that 
decentralised budgeting poses a challenge to financial accountability; and that the ‘business’ 
of public service may have increased the abuse of official power.” In addition, Pereira, 
(2001) laments that NPM reforms involving increased flexibility and autonomy may be seen 
as a new opportunity for nepotism and clientelism. Of all the commentators, Hood (1998:29) 
goes straight to conclude that the “three commonest failings” of NPM are “bribery, 
misappropriation and extortion; front-line abandonment; and the use public organisations for 
personal ego-trips” (Hood, 1998:29)-which all point to corruption.  
 
According to Gratto, Preston and Snilsberg (2002:4) NPM has two major implications for 
corruption: firstly, it creates the potential for corruption in a wide range of actors and that the 
flexibility of these networks makes it more difficult to maintain accountability and oversight. 
Secondly, the line between the government and private sector actors becomes increasingly 
blurred in NPM. In agreement, von Maravic and Reichard (2003:85) note that NPM 
indirectly fosters corruption as it contributes to: 
• A decline of an ethics infrastructure, and of alienation and insecurity of public 
servants  
• Intensified markets for contracts and rent seeking behaviour of market participants 
• A possibility of underpinning supervision and control of the administration due to the 
decentralisation and fragmented structure of purchaser-provider models  
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In particular, the NPM favours contracting out of public goods and services in the delivery of 
public services. Contracting out is seen as key to the creation of competition necessary for 
the efficient and effective delivery of public services (Metcalfe and Richards, 1990). 
However, “contracting out enhances the risk of corrupt practices at the interface between 
private business and governmental discretion” (Gregory, 1999:66). In this regard, more often 
than not the contracting-out process is open to corruption, mismanagement, profiteering, 
waste and public immorality (Caiden, 1982:143; Huque, 2004). This is the case as “markets 
are and will continue to be a force tending toward corruption” (Warren, 2004:340). On the 
one hand, a person in a high position who formulates government policy or is able to 
influence government decision-making seeks, as a quid pro quo, payment for exercising 
discretionary powers vested in him or her (Jiyawickrama, 2001:283). On the other hand, 
powerful actors are motivated to penetrate government wherever possible, either to get 
privileged access to government contracts or to affect the rules of competition in ways 
favourable to them (Warren, 2004:340). If this happens, “contracting relationship 
(becomes)…one of mutual dependence than one of promoting economic competition” (Self, 
1993:127).   
 
In addition, out-sourcing is intended to introduce a financier/purchaser/provider spilt in the 
delivery of public services. In most cases the politicians are perceived as the financiers, 
administration as the purchaser, and private firms (contractors) as providers (Schedler and 
Proeller, 2000:85). Von Maravic (2003:13) observes that who is actually the purchaser and 
the provider depends very much on the situation. Von Maravic further argues that between 
all these actors corruption is possible “because they all potentially belong to the public 
production process and use public money for service delivery” (von Maravic 2003:13). 
Moreover “sectors where corruption flourishes are the ones where the government and 
private firms have a commercial contractual relationship” (Meny, 2000:205).  In this regard 
von Maravic (2003:13) proposed a typology of corruption in the financier/purchaser/provider 
split as captured in table 1 below: 
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Table 2.1  A Typology of Corruption  
 
Financier Corruption  Purchaser Corruption  Provider Corruption  
Bureaucrat bribes Politician  Politician bribes 
Bureaucrat  
Politician bribes Market 
participant  
Market participant bribes 
Politician  
Corruption Between 
Departments  
Bureaucrat bribes Market 
participant  
 Market participant bribes 
Bureaucrat  
Corruption between Market 
participants 
 
Source: von Maravic, 2003: 13  
 
 
Further, the NPM paradigm champions privatisation as a means to get rid of inefficient 
public enterprises, open more room for accountability, and enhance competition.  However, 
just as in contracting-out, “the process of transferring assets to private ownership is fraught 
with corrupt opportunities” (Rose-Ackerman, 1999:35) and “ends up as a simple 
rearrangement of the rent-seeking playing field” (Hopkins, 2002:584). In many cases, 
privatisation has “amounted to little more than the licensed theft of state property” (Brown 
and Cloke, 2004:288) because the bureaucrats and politicians see privatisation as an 
opportunity for self-enrichment (Hopkins, 2002:584).    
In addition, NPM favours decentralisation as an appropriate service delivery mechanism. The 
argument is that being closer to the people, local authorities will easily identify peoples’ 
needs, and thus supply the appropriate form and level of service delivery (Enemuo, 2000). 
However in many instances, “decentralisation is attended by an increase in the number of 
persons who are involved in corrupt acts” (Manor, 1999:101). The local elites use control 
over local government to further personal gains, rather than promote community 
development. Selfish council officials exploit and take advantage of the new opportunities 
presented by the decentralised structures to pursue their personal gains. Since in a 
decentralisation system resources are spent and invested at the elected official’s discretion 
(Mawhood, 1993:2), decentralised governance becomes a vehicle for bringing the once 
centralised and hidden resources closer to the local political elites for plunder.  In this 
context, Manor (1999:74) noted that the creation of elected councillors and the 
decentralisation of resources onto these structures in the Indian State of Karnakata led to 
increased corruption. 
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Moreover, due to the overemphasis of results, public officers adopt undesirable and corrupt 
means just to produce better results (Haque, 2000:608). After all with NPM it does not matter 
how you reach the results but what matters are the results themselves. In addition, 
performance management and emphasis on results has made managers to cheat the system by 
reporting high performance scores although they have obtained low results.  
 
To conclude, the NPM has been accused of opening “floodgates of corruption” (Polidano and 
Hulme, 2001:287) because in general, the introduction of the private sector motivations and 
practices has weakened the core ethos of public service within the public sector (Brereton 
and Temple, 1999:455). In many instances NPM has resulted in the ‘aggrandizement of 
management’ (Hood, 1991:9) and politicians. This is the case as NPM “assumes the culture 
of honesty as given and devices instituted to ensure honesty and neutrality (such as rules of 
procedure and restraints on discretion) were therefore removed without concern” (Hood, 
1991:16). Moreover, accountability in the NPM is more fluid (Hughes, 1998:234) since 
“accountability by contracts is based on the idea of opportunistic behaviour, whereby people 
learn to distrust each other” (Christensen and Laegreid, 2004:20). Therefore, even if NPM 
reforms “increase frugality and efficiency, these gains are bought at the expense of honesty 
and fair dealing and of security, resilience” (Hood, 1991:16), accountability (Minogue, 
1998:32) and corruption.  
 
 
2.4.3    CONTEXTUALISING THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND                     
            CORRUPTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE ‘SOFT STATES’ 
 
2.4.3.1    THE SOFT STATE 
The concept of ‘soft state’ was first developed by Myrdal (1968) in his book “Asian Drama”, 
in direct reference to the post-independence South Asia. However, the attributes of the soft 
state are not only unique to Asian Countries and can be applied to the rest of the developing 
world and Africa in particular (Mkandawire, 1998; Tetzlaff cited in Ebermann, 1998:9; 
Bayart, 1993). Moreover Myrdal himself agreed that  “the soft state falls under the categories 
of undesirable conditions –attitudes, institutions and policies- and one of the main 
characteristics of underdevelopment” (Myrdal, 1968: 1909) to which most of the African 
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countries belong.  In fact in modern times African states are more ‘soft’ than Asian states 
which have now become ‘developmental’ or ‘hard’ states  
According to Myrdal, a soft state is the one where “policies decided on are often not enforced 
(and) the authorities even when framing policies are reluctant to place obligations on people” 
(Myrdal, 1968:66).  For Myrdal (1968), central to the soft state is the fact that “the level of 
social discipline is low” (Myrdal, 1968:277). In this regard “there is unwillingness among the 
rulers to impose obligations on the governed and corresponding unwillingness on their part to 
obey rules laid down by democratic processes” (Myrdal, 1968:277). In his 1970 work on 
World Poverty, Myrdal stipulated that the indiscipline of the soft state manifests itself in 
deficiencies in legislation, a widespread disobedience by public officials on various levels to 
rules and directives handed down to them, and often their collusion with powerful persons 
and groups whose conduct they should regulate (Myrdal, 1970).  To this end, Osaghae 
(2003:1) comments that “the soft state and its associated problems is attributed to the 
distorted social order and related pathological political, economic and social relations”. This 
stand was echoed by Tetzlaff (cited in Ebermann, 1998: 9) in his formulation of “The African 
soft state”. He noted that the African soft state is characterised by: 
 
• a deficient predictability and discipline in all political matters,  
• a chronic lack of publicly accessible know-how and resources to enforce authority 
• laws and decrees are ignored (without consequence of those who violate them) 
• bureaucratic processes are disturbed by incompetent politicians,  
• the professional ethics of government officials is offended and public officials are 
demoralised  
• the utilisation of public means is not regulated  
 
2.4.3.2.      CORRUPTION IN THE SOFT STATES  
Myrdal outlines four main problems that haunt the soft states which include low discipline, 
tax evasion, black-marketing, and corruption (1968:894).  For the purpose of this study 
concentration will be put on the fourth problem – corruption.  
 
Corruption is a characteristic feature of soft states. In this regard, Myrdal attests that “the 
prevalence of corruption is one aspect of the soft state” (Myrdal, 1968:550). In fact 
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“corruption is one of the forces that help to preserve the soft state with its low degree of 
social discipline” (Myrdal, 1968:552). In this manner, Osaghae, (2003:1) agrees that the 
unique nature of soft states is that it has ethnicity, nepotism, and corruption as underlying 
elements.  However, ethnicity and nepotism both point to corruption. In soft states, 
corruption is institutionalised so that it is a norm rather than an exception (Theobald, 1999). 
Bayart, (1993) characterised the corrupt relationships existing in the soft state as the “politics 
of the belly”. In a Transparent international corruption study of 102 countries, 70 countries 
most of which were the “worlds most poverty stricken countries” scored less than 5 out of the 
clean score of 10 (Transparency International, 2002:1).  All of these ‘most poverty stricken 
countries’ are soft states since underdevelopment characterises the soft state (Myrdal, 1968: 
1909).  
 
Corruption is rampart in soft states because of the laxity and arbitrariness that are exploited 
for personal gain by people who have social, economic and political power (Perera, 2003:20). 
This line of thought is further advanced by Goldthrope (1975:265) who argues that in soft 
states corruption is high since “formal rules …are applied copiously and in a lax manner 
rather than vigorous and consistently…(and) private advantage can be gained and private 
bargains struck concerning the enforcement or non enforcement of the rules”. He further 
highlights that “besides money, another inducement is kinship settlement and another is the 
favour of superiors” (ibid).    The prevalence of corruption in a soft state is better explained 
by Mobutu Seseseko, the former president of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of 
Congo), a well-known soft state, when he once attested that: 
 
When I had to travel, I would tell my advisor that I needed one million dollars.   My advisor 
would tell the Prime Minister to pass on two million dollars. The Prime Minister would tell the 
Minister of Finance to give him three million dollars. The Minister of Finance would give the 
Director of the Central Bank the order to hand over four million dollars. The Director would 
withdraw five million dollars. And I would be given one million dollars. That’s it! (Mobutu 
Seseseko, quoted in Bergman, 1998: 9-10) 
 
It must be noted that corruption in the soft state takes place in the whole civil service strata. 
Both senior and junior public sector employees participate in corrupt activities. This is the 
case as the management of government in soft states is already afflicted by corruption and 
nepotism (Polidano, 1999) and due to the low level of social discipline (Myrdal, 1968:950). 
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In this manner, “while the opportunities for large scale exploitation opened up by the soft 
state are only at the disposal of the upper class, even persons quite low in the social ladder 
often find such opportunities for petty gains” (Perera, 2003:20).  
 
 
2.4.3.3.   THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN THE CORRUPTION PRONE 
                  SOFT   STATES   
As it has been noted in the sections above, literature has it that the New Public Management 
paradigm fosters corruption. Its doctrinal components inherently, create a lot of loopholes for 
corrupt activities to take place. In this manner, its elements create opportunities, motivations, 
and incentives for corruption.  
This situation becomes worse when the new public management is implemented in soft 
states. This is the case as due to the lack of social discipline and the already prevalence of 
corruption in soft states, public officers make use of avenues created by the new public 
management to advance their own personal interests. In this manner, the new public 
management is seen to ‘fertilise’ the already corrupt prone public sector with new 
mechanisms for increased corruption.  In this regard, the impact of new public management 
on corruption becomes worse in soft states.  
 
2.5. THE PUBLIC GOVERNANCE PARADIGM  
 
Although some authors prefer to treat the Governance and the NPM approaches as the same 
(for example Rhodes, 2002), they are fundamentally different (see Salamon, 2002). In 
essence Governance is a political theory while NPM is an organisational theory, and 
Governance is about process while NPM is about outcomes (Peters and Pierre in Ewalt, 
2001:8). Those that interpret “Governance as the New Public Management” (Rhodes, 
2002:211) capitalise from the fact that governance is so “multi-dimensional” (Esterhuyse, 
2000:61); has “started to change over time” (Cloete, 2000:3) and that it has milliards of 
meanings that eventually render it meaningless. This has led one commentator to lament that 
the concept of governance is so “imprecise”, and “woolly” and it “does not have an agreed 
upon meaning” (Frederickson, 2004:6).  This is precipitated by the fact that it is used in 
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almost all academic disciplines. It is for these reasons that this study restricts Governance to 
Public Governance.  
 
Kickert (1997:182) defines Public Governance as “government ‘steering’ in a complex 
network of social actors” and Rhodes (2002: 215) refers to it as “self-organizing, 
interorganisational networks”. This is echoed by Kooiman (cited in Cloete, 2000:16) who 
describes governance as “purposeful activities …aimed at guiding, steering controlling or 
managing aspects or facets of society”.  
 
These definitions presuppose that Public Governance redefines the relationship between the 
state (public sector), society and the markets (Nolan, 2001:191) by “emphasising on the 
benefits that collaborative, and inter-agency partnerships can offer as a means of achieving 
public policy goals” (Lowndes and Skelcher, 2002: 302). In this regard, public governance 
entails the inclusion and interaction of all individuals and social groups involved in and 
affected by the delivery of public services. Public Governance emphasises the 
“interdependence between governmental and societal actors as one of crucial variables 
influencing the performance of public actors” (Daemen, 2000:54). As a result “complexity, 
pluriformity, pluricentrism, self-steering” (Kickert, 1997:184) are characteristic concepts of 
the Public Governance model. This line of thought is further pursued by Salamon (2002:9) in 
his comparative definition where he compares the public governance paradigm (he calls 
Public Governance ‘New Governance’) with the traditional public administration which it 
seeks to replace as illustrated in the table below: 
 
 Table 2.2: Comparison Between The Traditional Public Administration And The New 
                    Governance Paradigm 
 
Classical Public Administration          New Governance  
Program / Agency  Tool  
Hierarchy  Network 
Public vs. private  Public + private  
Command and control Negotiation and persuasion  
Management skills  Enablement skills  
       
Source: Salamon, 2002:9 
 24
According to Salamon (2002: 9-18) the above comparisons bring into the fore some pertinent 
definitional issues of the Public Governance approach as follows:  
• Governance shifts focus in problem solving from public agency or individual public 
program to the distinctive tools or instruments through which public purposes are 
pursued 
• Governance shifts attention from hierarchic agencies to organisational networks 
• Governance removes sharp division between public and private spheres by blending 
the two together through collaboration rather than competition, to utilise 
complementarities that exist among the sectors to help solve public problems  
• Governance replaces command and control with negotiation and persuasion as the 
preferred management approach, not only in setting of policy but in carrying it out 
• Governance shifts focus from management skills to enablement skills of ‘activation’, 
‘orchestration’ and ‘modulation’ needed for the engagement of horizontal network 
partners (Salamon, 2002: 9-18). 
 
 
2.5.1.     THE RATIONALE FOR THE PUBLIC GOVERNANCE MODEL 
 
Most public management commentators support the Public Governance model because it 
involves the creation of “structures and practices that achieve accountability and equity while 
at the same time providing government flexibility, responsiveness and participation” (Nolan, 
2001:191). Moreover the central feature of public governance is empowerment. This 
empowerment involves “granting enhanced powers of consultation to the clients of the 
organisation as well as involving lower-echelon workers in decisions taken by the 
organisation” (Kernaghan in Peters and Pierre 2001:7) and external actors. In addition, the 
interdependencies in public governance mean that service delivery cannot be hampered by 
resource insufficiency. This is the case as network “actors need each other because resources 
like authority, expertise, finances and political support are not usually in one source” 
(Daemen 2000:57). Cloete (2000:24) summarises the ideals of the Public Governance model 
in the following policy objectives: 
• Representivity and equity in resource control and allocation 
• Developmental and growth focus 
• Participatory, responsive, people centred  
• Democratic rights, stability, legitimacy and transparency  
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• Political and financial accountability  
• Professionalism and ethics 
• Flexible, effective, efficient and affordable process 
• Coordination, integration and holism of services 
• Creative, competitive and entrepreneurial practices  
• Sustainable results (economic, social, political administrative, technological) (Cloete, 
2000:24).  
 
2.5.2. PROBLEMS WITH THE PUBLIC GOVERNANCE MODEL  
  
Although in most cases the Public Governance model is regarded as a feasible solution to the 
ailing public sector, it has some shortfalls. In the first place the governance approach has not 
been fully implemented because its implementation is “not an easy task” (Nolan, 2001: 191) 
and is not “uniformly smooth” (Brinkerhoff, 2000:213).  In fact the World Bank (cited in 
Cloete 2000:24) observes that “governments across the world find it hard to use the public 
governance approach in the exercise of their functions”. This is the case as public governance 
“brings together groups with a history of opposing views and objectives, and of mutual 
distrust that now need to work closely together… for example in many countries government 
officials view NGOs (Non Governmental Organisations) and CSOs (Civil Society 
Organisations) with suspicion or animosity” (Brinkerhoff, 2000:213).    
 
Secondly, the governance approach is feared to result into government ‘free-riding’. Due to 
interdependences and over-reliance on external actors, government may relegate its service 
delivery responsibility to these external actors. This is compounded by the fact that 
“integrated networks resist government steering, develop their own policies and mould their 
environment” (Rhodes, 2002:215). As a result, questions over issues of equity and social 
justice may arise.   
 
Related to the above, public governance brings in an “instance of private government” 
(Rhodes, 2002:221). This entails that government becomes preoccupied with faithfully 
serving network members rather than public service delivery.   This is compounded by the 
fact that some network members do not enter into networks with a service delivery motive 
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rather they are concerned with maximising political privileges and avoid central government 
control   necessary for their private programs.  
  
 
2.6.        CONCLUSIONS AND DEDUCTIONS  
 
This chapter has explored theoretical concepts regarding public sector reforms. It 
concentrated on two main reform packages namely; the New Public Management (NPM) and 
the Public Governance Paradigm. It has also looked at the dysfunctional consequences of the 
two reform prescriptions. On the one hand, literature has it that New Public Management 
results in the loss of political control and corruption. On the other hand, reform 
commentators agree that the Public Governance model is difficult to implement, and results 
into government free riding.   
 
In line with the impact of the new public management on corruption, it can be deduced from 
the literature review that the effects are more pronounced in ‘soft states’. This is the case as 
these states already lack a sense of social discipline and corruption is already the modus 
operandi. In this manner, new public management is seen to provide more opportunities and 
avenues for corruption.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
PUBLIC SECTOR REFORMS IN MALAWI 
 
3.1.       INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents public sector reforms in Malawi. It is organized into four main sections. 
Section One introduces this chapter while section Two presents background information to 
the reforms in Malawi. Section Three brings fourth first generation reforms and in Section 
Four second generation reforms are presented. Section Four is further subdivided into three 
subsections, namely: Pressures for Reform, The Reform Process, and Problems Encountered 
in the Reform Process.    
 
  
3.2.     BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
 
This section explores public sector reforms in Malawi. Malawi became independent in 1964 
after 73 years of the British colonial rule under the leadership of Hastings Kamuzu Banda. 
Soon Banda degenerated into a dictator, made himself life president and his Malawi 
Congress Party became the only legal political organization in the country. The thirty years 
of Banda’s reign were so authoritarian that they were deemed to be “days of death and 
darkness” (Mutharika, 2003:10), the “thoughtless state of despotism” (Mapanje, 2002:184), 
“extreme authoritarianism” (Phiri and Ross, 1998:10), and the “most repressive, corrupt, 
predatory and violent political system in Africa” (Ihonvbere, 1997:225). 1994 saw the end of 
the Banda dictatorial regime in the county’s first ever-democratic multi-party elections. The 
country became a democracy under the leadership of Bakili Muluzi.   
 
It is against this background that the study categorises the reforms in Malawi into two: The 
first generation reforms and the second-generation reforms. The second-generation reforms 
refer to those reforms implemented in the Banda era while the second-generation reforms are 
those implemented in the democratic era.   
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3.3. THE FIRST GENERATION REFORMS  
  
The reform of the Malawi’s public sector takes its historical roots from the immediate post 
independence days in 1964. At this time the new Malawian leaders sought for ways and 
means to effectively and efficiently manage the postcolonial civil service. The issues at stake 
were mainly two: firstly there was the quest to abandon the British oriented civil service and 
create one that would adequately be used to obtain and achieve local aspirations by “making 
it more relevant to the socio-economic goals of the independent Malawi” (Msosa, 1998:23). 
Secondly, there was the will to “manage the transition from expatriate-based civil service to 
one dominated by Africans” (Durevall, 2001:5). To this effect, Thomas Skinner was 
commissioned to analyze the public sector and proposed recommendations to improve it. The 
Skinner Commission recommended a new salary structure and job redefinition that meant a 
reduction in the salaries of the civil servants. The reasoning was that “it would no longer be 
appropriate and the country could not afford to continue with the generous standards of pay 
and conditions of service which were obtained for the colonial administrators” (Msosa, 
1998:23). Although the Banda administration implemented the Skinner Commission’s 
recommendations, the deductions were resented and ministers objected it, leading to what is 
commonly referred to ‘the cabinet crisis’ (the massive expulsions and resignations of 
ministers that took place two months after independence in 1964). 
 
The Malawi Government realized that the Skinner Commission only concentrated on 
recommendation that would ensure a cost effective postcolonial civil service and did not 
regard the reform of the public sector institutional structure and design. The government saw 
that there was need to put in new public organizational structure and design that will 
adequately work in the pursuit of the independent Malawi development agenda. In this 
regard, Malawi commissioned a review by the Economic Commission of Africa (ECA) in 
1966. The review championed for the employment of effective leadership and institutional 
arrangements for the service (Msosa, 1998: 23). These measures were aimed at “increasing 
public sector efficiency and improving administrative capacities in state institutions” 
(Durevall, 2001:5). However, Msosa (1998:23) observes that “only recommendations to 
reorganize Government ministries were fully implemented”. 
 
Subsequently, the Civil Service Review Commission (CSRC) (also called the Herbecq 
Review Commission) was instituted in 1985. Msosa (1998: 23-24) reports that its mandates 
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were two fold:  firstly, they were to examine how to modify staff structure, career 
development, and job grading and personnel management in order to improve the civil 
service and make use of the human and financial resources available. Secondly, it was to 
analyze the capacity of Malawi’s educational and training institutions to provide for the needs 
of the public corporations and the civil service. The Herbecq Review’s recommendations can 
be classified into human resources management and financial management. The human 
resources recommendations embraced the introduction of “career paths, job evaluation 
system, open performance appraisals and strict control of establishment growth by 
rationalizing the number of industrial class employees to realize cost effectiveness in the 
public service” (Msosa, 1998:24). The financial management recommendations proposed “a 
strengthened audit functions in Government to embrace value for money audits” (Msosa, 
1998). Again, Msosa (1998:24) reports that these reforms were not fully implemented and 
the civil service grew from 10, 745 in 1964 to 50,008 in 1987.  
 
3.4.      THE SECOND GENERATION REFORMS  
 
 
3.4.1  PRESSURES FOR REFORM  
 
There are many forces that contributed to the reform of the Malawi civil service in the 
democratic period. These can be categorised in line with the Pollitt and Bouckaert’s 
(2000:25-26) model of public sector reforms driving forces as: social-economic, political and 
administrative as discussed below: 
 
3.4.1.1   SOCIO-ECONOMIC FORCES  
 
The democratic leaders saw the old social-economic policies of the Banda regime as 
regressive and poverty perpetuating. Therefore they developed new national socio-economic 
policies that would be used to achieve good governance, democratic values while alleviating 
poverty. In this regard they instituted poverty reduction policies and programmes tuned to 
meet the new realities and challenges. These included the Vision 2020 and the Poverty 
Alleviation Programme as an operational policy. This necessitated the reform of the public 
service so that it could efficiently and effectively deliver and realize these aspirations. 
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Global economic forces also contributed much to the reform of the Malawi public sector in 
the democratic era. Malawi started implementing these reforms when the cold war had just 
ended. The end of the cold war symbolised the triumph of capitalism economic ideology over 
communism. This triumph initiated major changes in the way the public sector around the 
world was to operate. Key here was the implementation of market principles in the running 
of the public sector. In this tune, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and 
other donor institutions played fundamental roles in this period by implementing a series of 
economic stabilization policies. Like in other African countries these institutions funded a 
number of feasibility studies for civil service reform programs in Malawi to make it more 
efficient and transparent (Anders, 2003:1).  
 
The reforms in Malawi were also a product of socio-demographic changes. According to the 
1987 population census Malawi’s population grew to 8 million in 1987 representing a growth 
rate of 3.7 percent (National Statistics Office, 2000:viii). On the other hand in 1991 Real 
Gross Domestic Product Growth rate fell to –7 percent (Sen and Chinkunda, 2002). This was 
precipitated by the influx of the war refugees from Mozambique. This put pressure on the 
public service structure in terms of service delivery. As a result the civil service needed to be 
reformed so as to effectively deliver.                                                                                                             
 
3.4.1.2   POLITICAL SYSTEM 
 
The public sector reforms in Malawi were to a large extent a product of political forces. As 
noted earlier, Malawi had its first democratic elections in 1994 which saw the end of 33 years 
of Hastings Kamuzu Banda with his one party - Malawi Congress Party (MCP) - dictatorial 
rule and the coming to power of the United Democratic Front (UDF) under the leadership of 
Bakili Muluzi. The new democratic leaders considered the Banda civil service structures and 
motivational instruments as tools for the advancement of tyranny. Civil service reform was 
therefore necessary for democracy to be entrenched.  It is therefore not by coincidence that 
much of the study reviews for the reforms took place in 1993 (after the multiparty 
referendum in 1993) and their implementation begun in 1994 after the new government was 
sworn into office.  
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3.4.1.3  ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM  
 
The World Bank study of 1991, documented a lot of administrative system deficiencies that 
hampered service delivery. It found that the performance of civil service had deteriorated due 
to poor definition of responsibilities, inadequate and poorly targeted training, failure to 
undertake program evaluation and poor financial management.  In addition it was discovered 
that on the one hand pay levels were not enough to attract professional and technical staff, 
thereby creating vacancy rates of about 35 percent, and on the other hand there was 
overstaffing in the junior ranks where staff salaries were comparable to those in other sectors 
(World Bank, 1994:1).  Moreover, “inappropriate incentive structures have been identified as 
the fundamental cause of low productivity and poor work ethic, particularly in the civil 
service…. These include low salaries, poor monitoring and no punishment for poor 
performance (Mathews Chikaonda, former Malawi Minister of Finance, quoted in Cross and 
Kutengule, 2001:12). Thus these administrative system shortfalls necessitated the reform of 
the Malawi public sector.  
 
 
3.4.2 THE REFORM PROCESS  
 
A number of World Bank studies were instituted which gave the direction of reforms in 
Malawi. These included the Public Sector Management Review (World Bank 1993), and the 
Civil Service Pay and Employment study (World Bank 1994). The actual reform process 
commenced after the issuance of the ‘Policy Statement on Civil Service Reform and 
Institutional Development’ in 1994. The policy statement made it clear that it was 
“Government’s policy to periodically subject public sector organizations including the civil 
service, parastatal companies and local government institutions to external reviews of their 
operations, responsibilities, functions, structures and establishment levels” (Malawi 
Government, cited in Msosa 1998:25).  This was operationalised by the Civil Service Action 
Plan (CSAP) launched in 1996 that aimed to “improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
civil service, and financial management” (Durevall, 2001:6). The CSAP recommended the 
following reforms: 
 
• Rationalisation of institutional mandates and their realignment with policy objectives.  
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• Improvement in governance and public sector ethics, by establishing an Anti-
Corruption Bureau with oversight and investigative powers 
• Improvements in civil service performance, through reforms in personnel 
management and public sector pay.  
• Decentralisation of service delivery and development management functions through 
the creation of representative local government in rural areas. 
• Strengthening public expenditure management focusing on improvements in resource 
allocation and expenditure control through the implementation of the Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) where the budget becomes outcome oriented.  
• Contracting out some services such as security, cleaning office equipment 
maintenance to the private sector. (Malawi Government, 1996a) 
 
Based on the above policy background, individual ministries, government departments and 
parastatals have formulated action plans to implement these reforms and others that are 
particular to their working environment. By the year 2000 the Government had concluded 
some tasks laid down in the CSAP as follows:  
 
3.4.2.1.     DOWNSIZING AND RATIONALISATION  
 
One of the public sector reform initiative has been the downsizing of the public sector which 
had grown from 10, 000 at independence to 110,000 in 1995 (Cross and Kutengule, 
2001:12). To reach this end the Government instituted a census of the civil service. This led 
to the downsizing of the civil service which saw the retrenchment of 20, 000 employees (IMF 
and IDA, 2000:18). The retrenched employees comprised of workers in non-established 
positions and in non-priority areas. In addition, the census initiative exposed and helped to 
remove “ghost workers” and “ghost pensioners” from the payroll (Msosa, 1998).  
 
Downsizing also entailed the rationalization of the central government which led to a 
reduction in the number of Ministries from 27 to 19 (Fozzard and Simwaka, 2002:11). In the 
same manner, different autonomous agencies were created to carry out some tasks that were 
deemed crucial. Examples of these agencies are the Malawi Revenue Authority, the National 
Roads Authority, the Food Reserve Agency and the Anti-Corruption Bureau.   
Adamomoleken, Kulemeka and Laleye, (1997:215) expected that these reforms would result 
into a significant reduction in both the size and cost of the civil service. 
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3.4.2.2.    CONTRACTING OUT 
 
The government considers contracting out of some of its services as one of the mechanisms 
to promote efficient and effective delivery of services.  To meet this end, the Contracting Out 
Unit has been put in place in the Office of President and Cabinet (OPC) to oversee the 
contracting out of services in the public sector. In addition, sectoral departments and agencies 
are encouraged to contract out services which can best be carried out by the private sector. In 
order to identify potential services and functions to be subjected to contracting out, 
Departments must ask themselves the question:  “is it essential that this function/service 
(which is the responsibility of the Department) be performed in-house?” (Office of the 
President and Cabinet, 2000:38). In this regard, services that usually fall as candidates for 
contracting out include; office cleaning services, security services, laundry, catering, copy 
typing services, legal services, building and ground maintenance, messengerial services, 
audit services and secretarial services. 
 
2.4.2.3. PRIVATISATION 
  
The reform package in Malawi has also included the privatisation of public enterprises so as 
to stimulate the growth of the private sector. In this arena, the Privatisation Law was passed 
in 1996 giving mandate to the Privatisation Commission to carry out privatisation of public 
enterprises. The Privatisation Act stipulates that the main objectives of the privatisation 
programme are the following: 
• To foster increased efficiency in the economy  
• To increase competition an reduce monopoly in the economy 
• To promote participation by the Malawian public in enterprises 
• To raise revenue for the government (Malawi Government, 1996b) 
 
In addition, the Public Enterprise Reform and Monitoring Unit (PERMU) was established in 
the Department of Statutory Corporations of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
to “undertake continuous scrutiny of the financial performance of public enterprises and 
coordinate the reform efforts” (Malawi Government 2002). Since its establishment, the 
Privatisation Commission has privatised 60 enterprises. 
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3.4.2.4    USER FEES/ COST RECOVERY  
 
The public sector reform prescription also included the introduction of user fees for public 
goods and services. This includes services that were previously provided for free. The 
general feeling was that the government was having inadequate financial resources and 
increasing demands so “that it can no longer provide services free of charge” (Malawi 
Government, 1998c: 14).  Examples of these include the processing of birth and death 
certificates, marriage certificates, licences and permits, produce market fees, government rest 
houses, maternity clinics and dispensaries and other hospital amenities.   
 
3.4.2.5. PUBLIC –PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
 
It has for long been realised that the government does not have all the financial, institutional 
and human resource capacity to deliver services on its own. In this regard, partnerships with 
non-governmental organisations, the private sector and communities have been seen as key 
to the effective provision of services as these organisations have access to larger amount of 
resources in terms of money, and qualified and skilled staff. In this tune, it was estimated that 
in 1997 there were over 150 non-governmental organisations with income for development 
of over K440, 000 million. This was equivalent to 38 percent of the country’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and it was being spent among others, on relief and development, 
education, health, human rights, credit schemes, trade associations and environmental issues 
(Kalemba, 1997:31).  
 
3.4.2.6.    PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
 
The Malawi Government developed a performance management system handbook in 2000. 
One of the issues highlighted was that senior civil servants should be given the option of 
signing performance based three year contracts in which “employment was conditional to the 
achievement of performance targets” (Fozzard and Simwaka, 2002:13) with pay levels of 
about 500 percent above current ones and 50 percent increase in compensation net 
allowances (African Development Fund, 2004:5). At its inception, only those nearing 
retirement preferred the performance-based contracts while those in their early career stages 
were reluctant as they feared unjust performance appraisals and anxiety about the 
sustainability of the system itself.  However, in recent times more employees choose the new 
scheme and the government has made it compulsory for senior public managers.  
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Secondly, these contract- based performance management schemes have meant that public 
managers are responsible and accountable for outputs and outcomes rather than inputs and 
processes. In this regard performance agreements and expectations are made with public 
managers based on criteria and instruments for an objective assessment of those on 
performance contract (African Development Fund, 2004: 5). Politicians then assess public 
managers on how close they are to these agreed performance standards and their contracts are 
renewed or not based on this assessment. The African Development Fund, (2004:5) notes 
that this has increased the efficiency of the Malawi public sector as public managers “take 
advantage of better incentives in return for greater accountability in terms of agreed upon 
results”.  
 
 3.4.2.7  FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
 
The Malawi public sector has also undergone reforms designed to control public spending 
and improve the effectiveness of expenditure management. In this regard the Government put 
in place an outcome-based performance related budget and improve accounting procedures in 
the name of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). This tool ensures that 
budgets are programme or “activity- based and ceilings are allocated to sectors based on 
priority” (Malawi Government, 2003a: 3).  In this tune, “money is spent to produce results 
and performance is used as a criterion for annual budget allocations” to Ministries and 
Departments (Malawi Government, 2003a: 27). In order to ensure accountability for 
achieving the targets and milestones set by different programme activities, the government 
plans that disbursement of funds and supplies to these levels will be linked with results. To 
ensure discipline in spending within the set ceilings the Government uses a cash budgeting 
system where “Government facilities can only spend funds that are available - no overdrafts 
or credits” (Malawi Government, 2003b: 3). 
 
 
3.4.2.8.  DECENTRALISATION  
 
The Decentralisation Policy and the Local Government Act stipulated the transfer of 
managerial and financial authority from the Central Government to the District Assemblies to 
ensure efficient and effective service delivery. According to the Decentralisation Policy, the 
assemblies are “charged with the overall development of the district”.  
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It must be mentioned that all the local assemblies are corporate bodies (Malawi Government, 
1998b: 5) and “districts in their own rights” (Malawi Government, 1998a: 3). Accordingly, 
the district assembly is empowered to employ their own staff, enter into contracts and operate 
like any public organisation. Against this background, the above mentioned public sector 
reforms have also been implemented in the decentralised structures with the aim of “creating 
and strengthening institutional capacities for local government and development” (The 
Department of Local Government, 2001:32).  In this regard, Assembly managers are under 
contract, have managerial autonomy and are responsible to the local managers for their 
outputs rather that inputs and processes, there is activity based accounting and budgetary 
procedures and most of the services they delivery have a fee. In addition, service delivery is 
in most instances done through private contractors.  
 
3.4.3 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN THE REFORM IMPLEMENTATION 
PROCESS  
 
Although the reforms were successfully implemented, the implementation process was not 
without problems. The most notable ones include the following:  
 
Firstly the reform implementation process only enjoyed minimum administrative and 
political leadership. In this regard, Adamolekun et al (1997:213) agree that there was “no 
champion for reforms in Malawi”.  This was particularly the case as the reform package 
involved retrenchments. This brought fear of the prospects of being retrenched in almost 
everybody. In addition, administrative   leaders did not want to directly associate themselves 
with reforms which would lead to the misery of many in a country where job opportunities 
are scarce and poverty levels are very high. This is the case as those that championed such 
reforms were seen as ‘executioners’. For instance, in his research, Anders (2003:5) observed 
that dismissed civil servants complained that their bosses (those who retrenched them) were 
“selfish”. Moreover, the new political leaders promised people reduced poverty and 
increased job opportunities. They therefore feared that retrenchments would make them 
unpopular. This was compounded by the fact that labour unions took to the streets to fight 
against the downsizing of the public sector. 
 
Secondly, there were too many donors willing to fund the reforms while the administrative 
capacity was not strong enough to adequately contain and coordinate them.  For instance 
Adamolekun et al (1997:218) note that in June 1996, the following donors provided public 
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sector reform related assistance to the Ministry of Finance: International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Kingdom/Oversees 
Development Assistance (ODA), USAID, European Union (EU), Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) and the World Bank (WB). Because of   capacity overload and 
absence of efficient government machinery for harmonizing external assistance, these 
interventions were not well synchronized, resulting either in duplication in or retarded the 
implementation.  
 
Thirdly, it appears that the reforms were not well prioritised and sequenced in the 
implementation process leading to confusions and duplications. An example in this regard 
was the sequencing of functional reviews and job evaluations that were implemented 
simultaneously. Msosa (1998:28) observes that the right sequencing would be to start with 
functional reviews and end up with job evaluations. This is the case as functional reviews are 
aimed at streamlining Government’s administrative structures leading to the elimination of 
unnecessary functions.   In this regard “functional reviews would be a mopping up exercise 
which ensures that only necessary jobs should remain in the civil service” (Msosa, 1998:28).  
In addition the employees were retrenched when the government had not sourced adequate 
funds for the retrenchment benefits. For instance it took some retrenched employees as many 
as five years to be given their retrenchment packages. 
 
3.5.     CONCLUSIONS AND DEDUCTIONS:  ARE THE MALAWIAN REFORMS      
     NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REFORMS? 
 
This chapter focused on public sector reforms in Malawi. It classified the Malawian reforms 
into two: first generation reforms and second generation reforms. The first generation 
reforms comprised of those reforms introduced in the one party dictatorial era while the 
second generation reforms consisted of the reforms implemented in the reign of multiparty 
democracy. Pressures for reform, The Reform Process, and Problems Encountered in the 
Reform Process were also discussed.  
 
Although the Malawian reforms are not formally called NPM reforms it can be deduced from 
the prescription above that these are typical new public management reforms. For instance 
reforms pertaining to downsizing and rationalisation, contracting out, privatisation, user fees 
or cost recovery, public-private partnerships, performance management, financial 
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management, and decentralisation which Malawi has vigorously implemented, all fall under 
the realm of NPM (see Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 2003; Minogue, 1998; Larbi, 1999; and Kaul, 
1997) as discussed in Chapter Two under Literature Review. We can therefore safely 
conclude that the public sector reforms that Malawi has implemented are new public 
management reforms.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS  
 
4.1.    INTRODUCTION  
 
This Chapter presents operational instructions. It contains study methodology and design that 
the study uses to measure to what extent the NPM reforms in the Malawi’s local governance 
structures resulted in loss of political control and corruption. It is subdivided into five main 
sections. The first section looks at the study population and sampling frame, while the second 
section presents a profile of the sampled assemblies. Section Three contains the study design 
and data collection methods are set out in Section Four. In Section Five data analysis is 
explained.   
 
 
4.2.      STUDY POPULATION AND SAMPLING FRAME 
 
The population for this study is local government assemblies in Malawi. Malawi has 39 local 
government assemblies comprising of District, City, Municipal and Town spread in all the 
three administrative regions (Northern, Central and Southern) of the county as shown in table 
4.1 below: 
 
Table 4.1: Local Government Assemblies in Malawi  
 
REGION LOCAL GOVERNMENT ASSEMBLIES  
 District  Cities Municipalities  Townships  TOTAL 
Northern 6 1 0 1 8 
Central 9 1 0 3 13 
Southern 12 1 1 4 18 
TOTAL  27 3 1 8 39 
 
 
For practical reasons however, the study has sampled three local government assemblies to 
comprise the sampling frame. They include Salima Town Assembly (central region), Mzuzu 
City Assembly (Northern Region) and Zomba Municipal Assembly. They have been 
purposively chosen for two main reasons: firstly because they have implemented relatively a 
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greater number of the NPM reforms and hence it is here where the impacts of these reforms 
will be well noticed. Secondly these are impact areas of the researcher’s sponsors.   
 
4.3.     A PROFILE OF THE SAMPLED ASSEMBLIES  
 
Below is a profile of the three sampled assemblies: 
 
4.3.1   SALIMA TOWN ASSEMBLY  
 
Situated in the Central Region, Salima District covers an area of 2196 sq km and has the 
population of 248, 214 (National Statistics Office, 2000:xii). It is surrounded by Lake 
Malawi and Dedza, Lilongwe, Dowa, Ntchisi, Nkhotakota Districts. Salima is dominated by 
the Yao and Chewa tribes. The people of Salima largely rely on fishing and agriculture. 
Salima has two local assemblies namely: Salima District Assembly and Salima Town 
Assembly. This study covers Salima Town Assembly.   
 
The Political wing of Salima Town Assembly is comprised of 12 elected councillors headed 
by a Chairman. The management team comprises of the Director of Planning and 
Development, Director of Finance, Director of Administration, Director of Health and 
Community Services, Director of Parks and Recreation, Director of Agriculture and Natural 
Resources, Director of Education, Sports and Culture and Director of Public Works.     
 
4.3.2    MZUZU CITY ASSEMBLY 
 
Mzuzu City Assembly is in Mzimba District in the Northern Region of Malawi. It has the 
population of 86, 980 (National Statistics Office, 2000: xii) and is the third largest city in the 
country (after Blantyre and Lilongwe). The residents of Mzuzu are mainly working class and 
business personnel although there are small groups of farmers.  
 
Being a city assembly, the political wing of Mzuzu Assembly is headed by a Mayor. It has 16  
councillors each representing a ward. Below is the population distribution in the 16 wards.  
 
 
 
 41
Table 4.2: Population Distribution of Wards at Mzuzu City Assembly  
 
WARD  POPULATION  
Nkhorongo Ward  2,385 
Lupaso Ward  10, 084 
Zolozolo Ward   6,687 
Chiputula Ward  15,867 
Chibanja Ward   6,440 
Mchengautuwa Ward  16,112 
Katoto Ward  3,920 
Jombo Ward  1, 333 
Muzilawaingwe Ward  2,779 
Chasefu Ward  1,596 
Katawa Ward  2,876 
Masasa Ward  1,175 
Kaning’ina Ward 3,701 
Viphya Ward  6,752 
Msongwe Ward  1,540 
New Airport Site Ward 3,733 
TOTAL POPULATION 86, 980 
 
Source:   National Statistics Office, 2000:18 
 
The Administrative wing is headed by a Chief Execitive Officer.   The management team 
comprises of the Director of Planning and Development, Director of Finance, Director of 
Administration, Director of Health and Community Services, Director of Parks and 
Recreation, Director of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Director of Education, Sports and 
Culture and Director of Public Works.     
 
4.3.3.   ZOMBA MUNICIPAL ASSEMBLY 
   
Zomba District is the old capital of Malawi situated in the southern region of Malawi. It is 
the fourth largest city in the country (after Blantyre, Lilongwe, Mzuzu) covering 2580sq km 
and with the population of 540,428. Zomba is bordered by Machinga in the north, Chiladzulu 
in the south and Ntcheu in the west. The Yao ethnic group dominates it. The people of 
Zomba are basically smallholder farmers producing maize for household consumption. They 
also have small scale businesses. 
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Zomba is composed of two local government assemblies namely: Zomba Municipality and 
Zomba District Assembly. This study covers the Municipal Assembly. Zomba Municipal 
Assembly has the population of 65, 915.  Politically the Municipal has 14 councillors each 
representing a ward. It is headed by a Mayor.  Below is the population distribution in the 14 
wards.  
 
Table 4.3: Population Distribution of Wards at Zomba City Assembly  
 
WARD   POPULATION  
Mbedza Ward 3246 
Mtiya Ward 10176 
Masongola Ward  1732 
Chikamveka Ward  2542 
Chikamveka North Ward 8851 
Chirunga East Ward  4324 
Chirunga Ward  1591 
Likangala North Ward  9575 
Zakazaka Ward  5417 
Zomba Central  2684 
Chambo Ward  4310 
Sadzi Ward 5722 
Likangala Central Ward  4822 
Likangala South  923 
TOTAL POPULATION  65,915  
 
Source:   National Statistics Office, 2000:30 
 
The Chief Executive Officer heads the management team. The management team comprises 
of the Director of Planning and Development, Director of Finance, Director of 
Administration, Director of Health and Community Services, Director of Parks and 
Recreation, Director of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Director of Education, Sports and 
Culture and Director of Public Works.     
 
4.4. STUDY DESIGN 
 
This is basically an empirical study based on qualitative research design. The study used 
qualitative research design because it has a “unique and valuable contribution to make by 
generating a better conceptual framework for research” (Glaser and Strauss cited in Morton-
Williams, 1985:10).   In this regard the study uses qualitative research methods to interpret a 
cause and effect relationship among the following variables: New Public Management 
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(independent variable), local political control (dependent variable) and corruption (dependent 
variable).  Notes were taken by hand and/or with tape recorder and transcription begun 
within 48 hours. This ensured timely familiarisation with the data.  
 
4.5. DATA COLLECTION METHODS  
 
To adequately obtain its objectives the study utilises the following data collection methods:  
 
4.5.1. PERSONAL INTERVIEWS 
 
Personal interviews were administered to key informants in the local assemblies. These key 
informants included the local politicians (Councillors) and the Assembly Managers and 
Administrators. All the interviewees were promised that their responses would be held in 
confidence and that the researcher would make no individually identifiable attributes. This 
encouraged the interviewees to give full information without the fear of some negative 
implications and consequences. The 4.1 below shows the distribution of respondents in the 
sampled local assemblies: 
 
Table 4.4   Sample Frame for Personal Interviews  
 
Local Assembly  Councillors  Assembly 
Managers 
No Of Interviews 
Conducted  
Zomba Municipal Assembly  5 5 10 
Mzuzu City Assembly  5 5 10 
Salima Town Assembly  5 5 10 
TOTAL  15 15 30 
 
 
4.5.2   LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
The literature review component comprises the collection and review of pertinent literature 
on NPM related reforms, reports on conflicts between administrators and bureaucrats, and 
local government corruption cases. Official local assembly and government publications, 
letters, and memos were also investigated to provide insights.  
 
 44
4.6    DATA ANALYSIS  
 
The qualitative data was analysed by making systematic comparisons and aggregation of 
field notes recorded from each local government assembly that was included in the study 
sample frame. The analysis predominantly involved categorizing issues according to the 
recurrent themes regarding the loss in local political control and corruption arising from 
NPM reforms that emerged across sites. Special attention was paid to patterns, trends, 
theoretical constructs and themes evolving from the qualitative data collected. The study then 
formulated general conclusions and tested the hypothesis by induction.  No software was 
used to analyse the qualitative data as the amount of data could easily be manageable without 
such tools. “Word” and “Excel” were used to make tables based on the collected descriptive 
statistics.  
 
4.7   CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has presented operational instructions. It has presented the study methodology 
and design that the study uses to measure to what extent the NPM reforms in the Malawi’s 
local governance structures resulted in loss of political control and corruption. It looked at 
the study population and sampling frame, the profiles of the sampled assemblies, data 
collection methods and data analysis.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REFORMS, POLITICAL CONTROL AND 
CORRUPTION IN MALAWI’S LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
 
 
5.1      INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter presents research findings by looking at the current status in terms of political 
control and corruption in the light of NPM reforms in the Malawi’s local government system.  
It has two main sections. Section One presents findings on the impact of NPM on local 
political control in Malawi while Section Two looks at NPM and corruption in Malawi’s 
local governance. Under this section, Malawi is categorised as a ‘soft state’ and watchdog 
institutions of the Auditor General and the Anti-Corruption Bureau are analysed.   
 
5.2.     NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND POLITICAL CONTROL 
 
This section presents and analyses the impact of the New Public Management paradigm on 
local political control based on the findings in the selected Local Assemblies in Malawi. This 
study measures four NPM aspects namely contracting out, managerial autonomy, 
performance management and public-private partnerships. These aspects were chosen as the 
interviewees saw them as centres of political   control and potential areas of conflict.  
 
93 percent of the people interviewed attested that the new public sector reforms implemented 
in the   Malawian local governance system have led to reduced local political control. In this 
regard one Assembly Manager expressed that “councillors feel threatened by the Assembly 
secretariat” (interview conducted on 20th March 2005).  It was clear from the personal 
interviews the NPM reform elements meant that “political leaders have lost the capacity to 
control the delivery of many of the policies for which they are nominally responsible, and in 
some cases also have lost the power to formulate policy” (Peters, 2004:132).    
 
Table 4.1 lists the frequency of NPM factors that both councillors and assembly officials 
perceive as eroding local political control.  
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Table 5.1    NPM Elements Eroding Local Political Control  
 
Frequency for Councillors Frequency for Assembly Managers  Reform Element  
 No  % No % 
Contracting out  14 93 12 80 
Managerial 
autonomy 
13 87 14 93 
Performance 
management  
12 80 13 87 
Public–Private 
Partnerships  
14 93 12 80 
 
 
Note: Number of councillor interviewed = 15, Assembly Managers = 15 
 
 
As seen in table 4.1 above, the interviewees felt that the NPM aspects especially contracting 
out, managerial autonomy, outcome based management, performance management and 
private-public partnerships have led to reduced local political control in the sampled District 
Assemblies. These trends are further discussed in the sections below: 
 
 
5.2.1.   CONTRACTING OUT  
 
Table 4.1 above shows that 93 percent of the councillors and 80 percent of assembly 
management officials interviewed expressed that contracting out has reduced local political 
control and power. According to Christensen and Laegreid (2004:16), with contracting out, 
politicians expend little time and energy leaving it to the administration leaders, thus in 
practice transferring power and influence to them. Taking this into consideration, the 
councillors interviewed were concerned that contracting out has greatly reduced their power 
and control.  They felt that in the contracting out process, it is the managers who count rather 
that the councillors themselves.  The councillors are left out of the picture as contracting out 
is regarded as a managerial activity which is entirely under the realm of management. They 
see it as a policy implementation activity rather than a policy-making activity as a result, 
contracting out does not come under the control of councillors.  In this regard, councillors 
feel that they are losing power and control to contracting out. To this extent, one councillor 
expressed that contracting out is “purely a managerial activity that we are told not to get 
involved in. They only tell us that we will have a say when the contractors hand over the 
finished project” (Interview conducted on 22nd March 2005).  
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In addition, some councillors expressed that contractors do not respect them as they claim 
that they are under the responsibility of management and it is management that give them 
their money and not councillors. This makes the councillors feel unimportant before the 
contractors and as a result they feel losing their control and power to the assembly managers 
who are regarded highly by the assembly managers.  
 
In the same manner, 80 percent of assembly management officials also acknowledged 
contracting out as a point of contention between officials and councillors because councillors 
feel that they are losing power and control because of contracting out.     The managers felt 
that the councillors think that their role is undermined with contracting out. This is the case 
as they do not get actively involved in contracting out issues. One clear thing was that the 
councillors do not have the technical know how for the administration of contracts and even 
if they have, contracting out is not a policy making issue.  In this regard one Chief Executive 
Officer explained that “the process of contracting out is an implementation issue, not a 
policy making issue as a result it falls under the direct realm of management, not councillors. 
This makes councillors feel they are losing control as they cannot exercise their power on the 
contractors. This is compounded by the fact that almost every activity is contracted out and 
there is less of direct provision” (interview conducted on 21st March 2005).  
 
5.2.2. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT  
 
80 percent of the Councillors interviewed felt that performance management measures 
reduce their control. In particular, they cited employment of assembly managers on contract 
basis. The issue was that “since through contract based employment the public servant is to 
be managerially accountable, this is seen as detracting from the accountability to a 
responsible politician” (Hughes, 1998: 77). In this respect the councillors felt that with 
performance management it is the contract that controls the managers rather than the 
councillors themselves, although the Local Government Act places the assembly managers 
under the control of councillors. The councillors are concerned that the assembly managers 
are shielded by their contract that binds the councillors from effectively controlling the 
assembly managers. During the interviews one councillor expressed that "there was one 
instance where we did not want the Chief Executive Officer because of his dictatorial 
tendencies. We asked the Ministry of Local Government to dismiss him but they said his 
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three year contract had not expired. We felt we had no control over him although the Local 
Government Act puts him under us” (interview conducted on 20th March 2005).     
 
In the same manner, the fact that the assembly managers sign their contracts with the 
Ministry of Local Government rather than the councillors themselves indicates that the 
performance management instruments limit councillors’ control and power. In this regard, 
the councillors do not have the power to terminate managers’ contracts if they do not perform 
according to the agreed standards. This makes councillor feel that the real power and control 
rests in the Ministry of Local Government rather than them. In this respect, during the 
interviews one councillor was concerned that assembly managers “sign the contracts with the 
Ministry of Local Government, not us assembly councillors. This means that they are directly 
controlled by the Ministry. If we cannot control them or discipline them as we may 
contravene their contractual obligations it means we do not have any powers” (interview 
conducted on 21st March 2005).   
 
Confirming this view, 87 percent of the assembly managers interviewed attested that the 
concern of local political leaders in the assembly that contract based management erode their 
political control and power, provides for conflict. Councillors feel that they cannot 
adequately control assembly managers as they are protected by their contracts. In this regard 
managers acknowledged that councillors feel that managers can do anything without any fear 
as they are secured by their contractual agreements. In fact managers themselves confirmed 
that they feel more secure as their contracts entail protection form arbitrary decisions of 
councillors. 
 
5.2.3. MANAGERIAL AUTONOMY 
 
According to Christensen and Laegreid (2004: 21-22), “politicians lose control through 
greater administrative and commercial autonomy”.  The Local Government Act 1998 assigns 
councillors to “make policy and decisions on local government and development for the local 
government area”. It also gives the autonomy to assembly managers to “implement the 
resolutions of the assembly”. This division of labour gives the management wing the freedom 
to manage without political interference.  However, since it is the policy implementation 
aspect that is visible rather than policy formulation, councillors feel that it is the managers 
who have the power and control.  In this case, personal interviews conducted with councillors 
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revealed that 13 of the 15 councillors feel that their power and control is being eroded. This 
is attributed to the fact that the management team has more responsibilities and take on many 
things that councillors felt they would be doing. They have to be proactive and identify work 
for assembly and have the autonomy to manage. This makes councillors feel useless. In this 
regard some councillors expressed that “we are told to do nothing at the assembly rather than 
hear what the secretariat has done. If we do anything we are told we are interfering in policy 
implementation. This really makes us feel unimportant and lacking in political control 
(interview conducted on 21st March 2005). 
 
In the same manner, 14 of the 15 assembly managers interviewed confirmed that the 
increasing demands of greater responsibility for planning, supervision, implementation and 
communication with the public have reduced political control on local activities. Managers 
have the autonomy to carry out projects as required with minimal political interference and 
councillors view this as a usurpation of their control and powers.   Managers also expressed 
that since most councillors are not conversant even with policy formulation issues they 
constantly come to management for policy formulation advice. As a result, councillors feel 
powerless and are reduced to ‘mere rubber stamps’. To this extent one Chief Executive 
Officer felt that councillors are themselves to blame if they feel they are losing political 
control. This is the case as “they do not dwell much on policy making and seek much help 
from the assembly managers and ultimately it is the managers who make policies and 
implement them and as a result councillors feel they are losing control and power” (interview 
conducted on 20th March 2005). 
 
5.2.4. PUBLIC – PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS   
 
During the personal interviews it was noted that public-private partnerships are considered as 
a vehicle for reduced local political control and power. 93 percent of the councillors 
interviewed indicated that they feel losing political control and power due to the public–
private partnership arrangements. This is the case since managers now spend most of their 
times with private providers, non governmental organisations or   customers other than 
councillors. The local assembly managers neglect the councillors when they get preoccupied 
with external actors. Moreover, external partners do not most of the times get in contact with 
the councillors as most of the issues they are involved in are in the area of policy 
implementation rather than policy formulation. This makes councillors feel that they are not 
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important stakeholders in the assembly activities.  They also feel that they are losing power 
and control as most Assembly decisions are taken with external actors.   
 
Personal interviews with the assembly managers also revealed the same trends. As seen in 
Table 5.1 above, 80 percent of the assembly managers interviewed ascertained that they 
spend most of their time engaged with private providers and non-governmental organisations 
rather than councillors. The assembly managers were further asked to rank the frequency of 
their contact with different assembly stakeholders per week. These stakeholders included 
councillors, private sector organisations, non-governmental organisations and citizens.  Table 
5.2 below shows the frequency of the time assembly managers indicated they get in contact 
with different assembly groups per week: 
 
Table 5.2  Frequency of Managers’ Contacts with Different Groups 
 
Average Frequency of Contacts Per Week 
Very 
frequent 
Frequent  Not 
Frequent  
Not at all  
Assembly Groups  
No % No % No % No % 
Councillors  5 33 4 27 6 40 0 0 
Private sector 15 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Non Governmental Organisations 14 93 1 7 0 0 0 0 
Citizens  15 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: Number of Assembly Managers interviewed = 15 
 
As shown in table 5.2 above, assembly managers indicated that they get in contact more with 
private sector organisations, non-governmental organisations and citizens and less with 
councillors.  As indicated in Table 5.2, only 33 percent of the Managers interviewed 
indicated that they meet the councillors quite often, 27 percent mentioned that they meet the 
councillors often and 40 percent indicated that their interaction with councillors is irregular. 
In terms of private sector organisations, all the 100 percent of the Assembly Managers 
interviewed indicated that they meet the private sector organisations more often. This also 
applied for their contact with citizens. For non-governmental organisations, it was found that 
93 percent of the Assembly Managers indicated that they get in contact with them more often 
while 7 percent indicated that they meet them often. These trends confirm that councillors   
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spend less time with the assembly managers than other stakeholders. As a result, councillors 
feel left out in the local assembly processes. This makes them regard themselves as losing 
power and control in so far as assembly issues are concerned. 
 
5.3.        TACTICS TO REGAIN POLITICAL CONTROL  
 
The interviews revealed that as much as possible, councillors employ many tactics to regain 
the lost political control and power.  Du Voitel (1996:6) notes that politicians “get their 
revenge by influencing small scale daily business” while Hood (2000:16) observes that 
politicians regain their political control, by using “specific incursion into the management 
space”. This was validated by the personal interviews where interfere in policy 
implementation was the most common instrument the councillors used to regain the lost 
political control.  In this regard, councillors regarded their interference in policy 
implementation as the only way they could assert themselves and hence reduce the impacts 
of contracting out, performance management and managerial autonomy, and public-private 
partnerships on political control.   
 
In this tune assembly managers expressed that “there are some councillors who are a 
problem. They think we take up everything and they feel useless. As a result they would like 
to do managerial work” (interview conducted on 20th March 2005). Other managers 
emphasised that “some councillors have inferiority complex as they feel that they have fewer 
powers and would want to get more by getting involved in policy implementation” (interview 
conducted on 22nd March 2005).  An example was cited where councillors proposed that they 
recruit staff at the assembly instead of the Appointments and Disciplinary Committee. In the 
same arena, a Director of Finance echoed that “councillors would want to act as if they are 
internal auditors. They assess and examine each and every voucher processed when we have 
our own professional internal auditors”. Moreover, at one site, the Chief Executive Officer 
was demanded to hand over to the councillors his duties and let the Mayor use his office. At 
another site the Chief Executive Officer wrote to his Mayor that he “observed with a lot of 
concern that for a long time now, you (the Mayor) are unduly interfering in the decisions of 
the Assembly and performance of the Assembly Secretariat” (Memorandum of Assembly 
Chief Executive Officer to his Mayor of 29th July 2004).  A section of this memorandum is 
depicted in Box 1 below:   
 
 52
Box 5. 1:  A Case of Political Interference In Policy Implementation  
 
“The Objective of this letter is ….to appeal to you not to indulge in administrative/management 
issues of the Assembly, to take technical advice, and to request your Worship to develop trust 
and respect in the Management of the Assembly. May I also remind you Your Worship that 
yourself together with all the other Members of the Assembly have a duty to make policy. I am 
answerable to the Assembly for the implementation of such policies, and please discuss such 
issues with me when you feel the implementation is out of context”. (Source: Memo of 
Assembly Chief Executive Office to his Mayor of 29th July 2004).   
 
 
5.4.     NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND CORRUPTION IN MALAWI  
 
This section presents and analyses the findings on the impact of the New Public Management 
paradigm on corruption based on research conducted in the selected local assemblies in 
Malawi. This study measures five NPM elements namely contracting out, user fees/cost 
recovery, managerial autonomy, decentralisation, and public-private partnerships. To 
adequately understand the extent of the impact of the New Public Management on corruption 
in Malawi, it is imperative to discuss Malawi in the context of a soft state. This is the case 
since Malawi is already a corrupt prone country and the implementation of the new public 
management paradigm further widens the avenues for corruption.   
 
5.4.1.    MALAWI: A SOFT STATE?  
Malawi, like many African countries has all the qualities of a soft state (see Chapter Two). In 
particular, like any soft state, the country is ‘so porous and penetrated by society, so beholden 
to particularistic interest groups, so mired in patron-client relationships, and so lacking in 
stateness (Mkandawire, 1998:10). Like in any soft state, Malawi has a very low degree of 
social discipline and the country lacks appropriate institutions well equipped to enforce its 
laws.  In this tune, a National Integrity Systems study conducted in Malawi found that the 
country has “weak institutions of state restraint” (Khembo quoted in Transparency 
International, 2005:1). In general, responsible institutions lack the power to act (Chirwa, 
 53
cited in Khembo, 2005a) and most “cases are not followed to their logical conclusion” 
(Munthali, cited in Khembo 2005b).  
Just as in any soft state, corruption in Malawi features very highly. In fact corruption in 
Malawi is widespread, deep and severe to the extent that Khembo (2005b) referred to Malawi 
as a country “stuck in corruption”.  Chaziya (cited in Mchombo, 2002:2) noted that in 
“Malawi corruption is too much to the extent that things are not done according to merit”. In 
the same manner, Meinhardit and Patel noted that corruption in Malawi is severe so that 
public office is “pursued not as a vocation but as an occupation to redeem oneself and ones 
family out of poverty” (Meinhardit and Patel, 2003: 60). Even the Malawi government itself 
once admitted that “corruption is still high” (Mzembe, Cited in Khembo 2005a: 6). In 
addition, the former President of Malawi Bakili Muluzi also attested that “corruption in 
Malawi has been endemic and has slowed down economic growth” (Muluzi quoted in Mail 
& Guardian, 5 April 2004). The country’s donors have also been alarmed at the level of 
corruption in Malawi. For instance, the American Government could not give aid to Malawi 
because “Malawi’s greed and graft are so widespread that putting money where corruption is, 
is a waste” (Morrison, December 19, 2003). The Danish Government withdrew funds 
because “corruption has become a markedly increasing issue” (Danish Charge to Malawi Mr 
Pedersen in BBC News Online, 31 January 2002). The European Union did not only 
withdraw aid but also demanded refund from government of K650 million that they 
disbursed but was “diverted and mismanaged” (BBC online, 19 November 2001). 
 
Indeed in “Malawi corruption has, over the past few years, worked itself into the fabric of 
general living” (Mchombo, 2000:2). It is estimated that Malawi loses about MK22 million a 
year to corruption (Khembo, 2003:2) representing about 1/3 of its annual revenue (Khembo, 
2005b:9). According to the 2002 Transparency International country studies conducted in 
more than 30 countries in Africa; and 102 worldwide, Malawi was ranked positions 11 and 
35, respectively, on the corruption ladder (Transparency International, 2002).  In 2004 
Malawi stood among 60 most corrupt countries in the world and was ranked number 87 
scoring 2.8 points as compared to number 83 in 2003 (Khembo, 2005b:8).   
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5.4.2.    THE IMPACT OF NPM ON CORRUPTION IN MALAWI’ S LOCAL 
                  GOVERNMENT ASSEMBLIES  
 
Minogue (2000:8) observes that “there has been evidence that NPM reforms have been 
associated with increased corruption”.  This is supported by Washington, (1997:16) argument 
that “some of these reforms may have unintended impacts on the ethics and standards of 
conduct”.  Maesschalk (2004:465) adds that NPM type reforms are alleged to lead to more 
collective or even systemic unethical behaviour”. Personal interviews with both the 
councillors and assembly officials confirmed this stand. It was revealed that a lot of 
corruption cases arise due to the incentives and motivations provided by the loopholes in the 
NPM reform elements. Table 5.4 below shows councillors’ and managers’ opinions   
regarding increased corruption due to new public management.  
 
Table 5.3 Opinions On Increased Corruption Due To The NPM  
 
Frequency For Councillors  
 
Frequency For Assembly Managers NPM Reform Element  
No % No  % 
Contracting out  13 87 14 93 
Managerial autonomy 11 73 9 60 
Decentralisation 13 87 10 67 
Public-private partnerships 14 93 13 87 
User fees/cost recovery 13 87 12 80 
 
Note: Number of councillors interviewed = 15, and assembly managers = 15 
 
 
As can be seen in table 5.3 above, both councillors and managers felt that NPM leads to 
increased corruption. The study interviewed 15 councillors and 15 assembly managers. The 
trend was that 87 percent of the councillors and 93 percent of the assembly managers 
regarded contracting out as leading to corruption. In the same manner, 73 percent of the 
councillors and 60 percent of the assembly managers indicated managerial autonomy as a 
cause of corruption in the local assemblies. 87 percent of the councillors and 67 percent of 
the managers attributed corruption to decentralisation itself. In terms of public-private 
partnerships, 93 percent of the councillors and 87 percent of the managers regarded it as 
leading to corruption where as 97 percent of the councillors and 80 percent of the assembly 
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managers thought user fees lead to corruption. Each of these trends is further discussed in the 
sections that follow. 
 
 
5.4.2.1.     CONTRACTING OUT 
 
As shown in the table above, all the interviewees asserted that contracting out presents 
motivations, opportunities and possibilities for corruption. Through the personal interviews it 
was observed that assembly officials believed that contracting out provided more 
opportunities for officials to indulge in corrupt activities.  
 
More specifically, it was noted that in many cases the decision to enter into contracts was not 
based on an existing service need, but rather the desire to assist certain assembly officials in 
need. In these cases, “contracts are given out to alleviate official’s poverty” (interview 
conducted on 9th May 2005) rather than address the need of the assembly. In this regard, it 
was observed that when office bearers (both councillors and managers) were in financial 
problems, they were awarded contracts to provide some services that were not even needed at 
the assembly. Moreover, such contracts are mostly awarded without going through the 
normal tendering processes.   
 
In other instances, it was noted that office bearers, especially councillors, take a very 
proactive role in awarding themselves contracts. They expect that each time there is a 
contract at the Assembly they should be given a priority.  At one site, an example was given 
of a councillor who had a quarry and timber contracting company who always wanted to 
dominate in any constructing activity.  It was noted that “he goes to the Assembly office 
whenever there is a contract to connive with managers and give him constructing contracts” 
(interview conducted on 21st March 2005). 
 
In addition, interviews confirmed that nepotism and favouritism were allowed to guide the 
whole process of contracting out. In this regard, an analysis of the contracts awarded revealed 
a connection (whether relation or friendship) between those official in the contract awarding 
committee and those being awarded contracts. Normally contracts are awarded to relations 
and friends. In some instances the officials have their own contracting agencies registered in 
their relatives’ or friends’ names.  In this regard it was noted that at one site, even 
messengers have contracting agencies.  It was discovered that such agencies dominate almost 
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all the contracts at the Assembly thereby awarding themselves the contracts. In this arena, the 
bidding process becomes only a formality when it has already pre-decided who takes the 
contract.  
At another site, it was learnt that managers themselves prepare and write winning tenders for 
prospective contractors that they in turn themselves assess. The prospective contracting 
companies connive with Assembly officials to write winning tenders for them. It was 
observed that this happens especially when outside evaluators come.  When contracts are 
approved, the contractors give the concerned officials commissions.  
 
It was also observed that the Assembly officials use contractors to advance personal gains. 
This is the case as contracting officials have a lot of discretion. As such they contract out 
companies under the Assembly’s account to carry out private or personal activities. In this 
respect, at one site the sheriff executed a High Court order that the Assembly should 
surrender its properties for default of payment for cell phones officials contracted with 
Messrs Celtel Malawi Limited, but they had committed the Assembly as a subscriber for 
their personal handsets.     
 
5.4.2.2.   DECENTRALISATION 
 
Brueckner (1999) argues that corruption is more likely to be a problem in decentralised 
governments.   This is echoed by Washington, (1997:16) who agrees that decentralisation has 
implications for public accountability. The study confirmed this position.   As shown in table 
5.3 above, 87% of the councillors and 67% of the assembly managers attested to this.                                
  
The personal interviews revealed that decentralisation itself has brought in unhealthy 
breeding ground for corruption.  In most cases the councillors and managers agree to 
embezzle assembly funds. The general feeling of the respondents was that decentralisation 
has brought down the financial resources to the local elites which were once very distant 
from them thereby bringing avenues for corruption. In this regard one respondent commented 
that “decentralisation has created a lot of greed, expectations and aspirations. Councillors 
now regard themselves as members of parliament and they squeeze the assemblies to get the 
perks for personal use. In the same manner assembly officials regard themselves as cabinet 
ministers and sponge the Assembly of its meagre resources” (interview conducted on 20th 
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March 2005). As can be seen here, the problem is that the “NPM reforms provide these 
individuals not only with the opportunity to do corruption but also with the mindset to justify 
it” (Maesschalk, 2004:465).  
 
In many cases it was confirmed that office bearers exercise their discretion in the 
decentralised system for their private gain. Assembly officials take advantage of their 
discretionary powers to siphon the local assemblies of their resources. For instance at one site 
it was noted that the Mayor purchased retreaded tyres at K11, 750 which were sold to the 
Assembly at the price of new tyres as opposed to retreaded tyres. The tyres ripped-off within 
the month of purchase.  The Mayor verbally promised to replace the tyres but typical to every 
soft state, this replacement claim was not honoured.  
 
5.4.2.3.    MANAGERIAL AUTONOMY 
 
Washington, (1997:17) observes that a “corollary of management autonomy is that a 
reduction in detailed rules could allow more room for misconduct and mistakes”. Monteiro 
(2002:11) also expressed that “elements of NPM, such as managerial autonomy, were often 
unsuitable for implementation as it further eroded accountability in an increasing corrupt 
environment”. This study confirmed these views as it found out that Assembly Managers 
take advantage of their managerial autonomy to flout rules and embezzle Assembly 
resources.  In this regard the study observed that 73 % of the councillor and 60% of the 
Assembly Managers interviewed attested that issues of managerial autonomy provide 
openings to corrupt activities.  
 
The study noted that in Malawi’s local assemblies, managerial autonomy implies that 
Assembly Managers exercise an enormous amount of discretionary power in their everyday 
work. The general feeling through the interviews was that managerial autonomy has reduced 
councillors’ checks and scrutiny in the way the public service is run. Because managers have 
the autonomy to manage, they have used this to the attainment of their personal gains. For 
instance at one site councillors complained to the Districts Commissioner that they 
discovered that “your Director of Planning and Development and Building Supervisor have 
drained a lot of stores resources for their individual gains” (Memo of Councillors to the 
District Commissioner, 31 June 2004). 
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In addition, managerial autonomy also entails the control over the procurement process 
without any political interference. It is assumed that managers are well versed in procurement 
issues as such they should be freed from the political process to carry out such task. In 
addition procurement is regarded as an implementation exercise that lies under the realm of 
Assembly Managers. However, the study found that managerial autonomy in procurement 
has brought in opportunities for corruption. Moreover, in most cases councillors are 
presented with project materials “but do not know the cost of these materials and the 
quantities specified in the contract between the District Assembly and the supplier” 
(Ssewankambo, Chiweza and Nyondo, 2004: xii). In this regard, respondents for instance 
commented that “since the Assembly Manages are given the autonomy to do the purchasing 
process, shop owners give ‘commissions’ to the Director of Planning and Development (who 
purchases project materials) so that they can always purchase from them.  Some officers even 
put it as a condition that they will make their tender fail if they will not give them 
‘commissions” (interview conducted on 20th March 2005)   
 
 
The study also observed that managerial autonomy resulted in nepotism and favouritism. 
Since managers are free to manage and make some implementation decision, they abuse this 
freedom to advance personal gains. This was in the areas of recruitment and contracting out.  
In terms of recruitment, since they have the autonomy, managers favour their relatives 
although they may not be well qualified. The same also applies in the issuance of contracts.         
 
Lastly the study observed that increased managerial autonomy has eroded transparency and 
accountability in the local Assemblies because managers tend to use this freedom to define 
their own standards and ways of operating. In most cases the new standards tend to conflict 
with public ethics raising concerns for possible corruption. They could for instance choose 
not to be transparent by refusing the access of information to the public although legislation 
allows for unlimited access to public information. For instance, during the interviews the 
researcher was denied access to some corruption related information as the Assembly 
Managers regarded it to be “confidential”. This raises a lot of questions on accountability and 
transparency.  
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5.4.2.4.       USER FEES/ COST RECOVERY  
 
Washington, (1997:16) observes that “more direct contact with public money coupled with 
fewer controls over its use may increase the temptation and opportunities to indulge in 
corrupt or fraudulent practices and make conflicts of interests more likely”.  In the same 
regard Fjeldstad (2003:8) confirms that service user charges attract bribes to the bureaucrat. 
In their Malawian local government study, Ssewankambo, Chiweza and Nyondo, (2004: xiii) 
reported that there are also some cases of misappropriation and diversion of user charges 
funds leading to the stalling of project implementation. This study confirms this stand as 87% 
of the councillors and 80% of Assembly officials interviewed said that user charges are a 
conduit of corruption. 
 
The study observed that most of the money collected through user fees end up in private 
wallets.  It was noted that many officials “borrow the money on their own without the 
permission from higher authorities and they do not repay” (interviews conducted on 20th 
March 2005).  In other instances the assembly officials share the money collected though 
user fees as allowances for the job they have on done or workshops that never took place. 
Accounts personnel are also a problem. It was reported that most of the times they do not 
give out receipts for services delivered under users fees and they pocket the money.  
 
In addition, the study noted that that the account personnel also collect unauthorised fees. Not 
all services in the Assembly are subject to user fees. Other services are supposed to be 
delivered free of charge. This is the case as either the fees for those services have not yet 
been approved or the services are too socially desirable that the exclusion of those that 
cannot pay the user fees is unacceptable. But due to the presence of the paying services, some 
accounting assistants take advantage of the peoples’ ignorance to charge for even the free 
services. Mostly, the money collected ends up in private wallets.  
 
Moreover, the general trend in the interviews was that users in most instances would pay 
more than required so that the services can be quickly delivered. In other instances the 
Assembly workers demand bribes from the users so as to carry out the tasks quickly. Some 
Assembly officials were quick to point out that “we are pressed with work. We have too 
much work to do here. So if one wants us to help him within a day it is only kind of him to 
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pay us something. The balance is only a token of appreciation for the job done. If they 
become stingy their files stay on the pile for ever” (interview conducted on 21st March 2005).   
 
 
5.4.2.5.     PUBLIC- PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
 
 
With public-private partnerships, 93 % of the councillors and 87 % of the Assembly officials 
indicated that it brings opportunities and motivations for corruption. These results are in line 
with Meny’s (2000:13) argument that corruption flourishes in sectors where the government 
and private sectors have some relationships.  
 
The common trend as revealed by the personal interviews was that most private organisations 
would enter into partnerships so as to get a favour of some kind from the Assembly when 
there was a contract. In this line the partnerships are only taken as lines of communication to 
inform private organisations whenever there is a contract in the offing. In fact some private 
organisations that are members of the network expect and in other circumstances demand 
that whenever there are contracts they should be given the priority. In this tune, one manager 
commented that “private organisations make phone calls to the Assembly and establish work 
relationships so that they can get contracts” (interview conducted on 20th March 2005). In the 
same regard, it was observed that some private organisations form partnerships with local 
assemblies so that they should purchase state assets below market price. This is mainly 
evident during public auctions. Some respondents gave an example where a private 
organization in the network mounted pressure on the local assembly to sell its assets which 
the private organisation needed although the assembly did not want to dispose it off.  
 
In addition, public-private partnerships present opportunities for corruption by bringing in 
monies which assembly official feel can easily be embezzled. This is the case as in most 
cases there are no clear lines of accountability in the partnership dealings. Moreover most of 
the money that private organisations offer to the local assemblies is only given out as gifts 
with no stipulations on how the money should be used or accounted for. This opens such 
funds to corruption. For instance one official was convicted for stealing donations a private 
organisation made to the assembly for the rehabilitation of a road.  Commenting on the case 
one respondent hinted that “the official stole the money which a private company offered the 
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Assembly through their partnership. The court found him guilty of theft by a person 
employed in the public service and convicted him accordingly”.   
 
 
5.4.3. THE ROLE OF WATCHDOGS:  THE NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE AND 
THE ANTI-CORRUPTION BUREAU  
 
Malawi has public institutions that ensure increased public integrity and accountability. 
These are the National Audit Office (NAO) and the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB). One 
would expect that these institutions would work to minimise the effects of the NPM on 
corruption. However, the study found that since Malawi is a “soft state”, these institutions 
have not adequately controlled public officers in order to mitigate the impacts of the NPM 
reforms on corruption in Malawi’s local assemblies.    Despite their presence “cases and 
allegations of official corruption have risen in Malawi and the Auditor General has recently 
accepted that this problem starts with law makers in Parliament” (AFRODAD, 2005:18).  
Specific issues and problems regarding these institutions are discussed in the two sections 
that follow: 
  
5.4.3.1.     THE NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE  
 
The audit function in the Malawi public sector is done by the Malawi National Audit Office 
(NAO). The NAO is headed by the Auditor General (AG). Created by Section 184(1) of the 
Constitution, the Auditor General has powers to “audit and report on the public accounts of 
Malawi”. In accordance with Section 54 of the Local Government Act of 1998, the Auditor 
General is mandated to perform audits of Local Government accounts at least once a year. In 
the same regard, the Public Audit Act of 2003 requires the Auditor General to submit public 
finance reports every year to the National Assembly to which he or she is accountable.  
 
However, in reality, the role of the Auditor General is weakened by capacity and institutional 
constraints, poor enforcement of auditors’ recommendations and lack of seriousness on the 
part of government to discipline officials responsible for corruption and mismanagement. 
This makes the Auditor General unable to conduct audits in public institutions and it is the 
local government assemblies that suffer most (World Bank, 2003b: ix).  For instance the 
2003 audit report reflecting the 1999/2000 accounts (note that this is the latest audit report, 
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the 2004 and 2005 are not yet out) covered only five out of 39 local government in the 
country. This study’s sampled local government authorities were not covered.  Box 5.2 below 
gives a good picture of Malawi’s local government authorities’ audit status.  
 
 Box 5.2: Malawi’s Local Government Assemblies Audit Status 2
 
 
• 3 out of 27 District Assemblies accounts are audited up to 1999/2000 (i.e. up to date) 
• 10 out of 27 District Assemblies have not finalised their accounts for 1997/98 and 1998/99 
• Only 14 District Assemblies out of 27 have audited accounts for 1996/97 
• 2 out of 8 Town Assemblies have audited accounts up to 1999/2000 (i.e. up to date) 
• 4 out of 8 Town Assemblies have audited accounts up to 1997/98 
• 3 out of 8 Town Assemblies have not finalised their accounts for 1998/99 
Source: World Bank, 2003b: 41. 
 
According to the World Bank, a “credible public audit system can be measured by the 
predictability and consistency of its operations and reports as an institution of accountability” 
(World Bank, 2003a: 21).  In the case of Malawi’s local government assemblies, as shown in 
box 5.2, the audit reports are neither predictable nor consistent.  In most cases the annual 
reports are “ready several years after the end of the fiscal year making it very difficult to hold 
Controlling Officers responsible for mismanagement” (Durevall and Erlandsson, 2005:31). 
Moreover, even after their late production, the quality of the local government audit reports is 
not impressive. They “suffer from poor quality data and analysis” (World Bank, 2003a: 21) 
and are “not up to international standards in most Local Government Assemblies” (World 
Bank, 2003b: 40).  There are several issues and problems that contribute to this state of 
affairs. These are discussed below:  
 
Firstly, the NAO has suffered from poor capacity and limited ability to fully exercise its 
mandate. The total number of skilled personnel is inadequate.  In this regard, there is a 
mismatch between the number of spending centres and the number of staff working under the 
Auditor General. As a result, it has not been possible to conduct audits of cost centres every 
year as is required (Malawi Government, 2003b). Specifically, in November 2004 there were 
210 vacant posts in the NAO out of the total of 320 posts (Durevall and Erlandsson, 2005:31) 
meaning that only 110 positions were filled. It must be noted that most of the filled positions 
                                                 
2 The 2003 audit report reflecting the 1999/2000 accounts is the latest audit report. The 2004 and 2005 are not 
yet out and when they are published they will reflect the 2000/2001 and 2001/2002 accounts respectively 
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are junior ranks (mainly clerical officers) and “lack training in basic auditing” (World Bank, 
2003a: 23). In general “there are very few trained auditors” (Durevall and Erlandsson, 
2005:31) and   “most of the audit staff in place are inadequately trained and qualified for 
their positions” (World Bank and IMF, 2004: 44).  In fact by 2003, there were only six 
qualified accountants in the NAO and salaries were too low to attract and retain staff with the 
necessary skills (World Bank, 2003b: ix). In this scenario, the few auditors available 
concentrate on central government activities and local governments are neglected.   
 
Secondly, the budget that is allocated to the Auditor General’s office is too small and under-
funded in practice. This makes it very difficult for the office to honour all of its programmes. 
In this circumstance, the few resources available are only used to audit central government 
and donor funded institutions and the local government units are left out as has been reflected 
in Box 5.2 above.  Table 5.4 below gives a picture of the total budget allocation to the 
Auditor General as a percentage of GDP from 1988/89 to 2003/04.  
 
Table 5.4:      Total Recurrent Allocation To The Auditor   General’s Office   
 
Period  Average Share Of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) %  
1988/89 -1992/93 0.033 
1996/97 -1998/99 0.026 
2001/02- 2003/04 0.032 
 
Source: Durevall and Erlandsson, 2005:30. 
 
As can be seen in table 5.4 above, the budget allocation to the NAO has not increased from 
1989 and it has even decreased. This is despite the fact that over the years the number of 
public institutions has increased. In fact it was in 1998 when local government assemblies 
became functional indicating increased workload for the office of the Auditor General but his 
budget deteriorated instead of being increased. It must also be noted that even out of the little 
that is allocated to the Auditor General, as shown in table 5.4 above, “the actual funding to 
the NAO is erratic and normally less than what is budgeted” (World Bank and IMF, 
2004:44). This has reduced the number of audits carried out per year, and the most affected 
government branches are districts and local government authorities. 
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 Moreover, record management in the NAO is generally weak. There is an apparent lack of 
computers and other technology. In September 2003, the only computer software in use was 
Microsoft Office, and this was used for the preparation of reports and other things; the actual 
‘audit procedures for planning, controlling and handling audits were still manual’ (World 
Bank, 2003b: 30).  This state of affairs makes document retrieval difficult; storage facilities 
not safe from fire and water; and in most cases only manual records exist (World Bank, 
2003b: vii).  This further makes it difficult to publish audit reports especially those belonging 
to local government assemblies (World Bank, 2003b: 41).  
  
Typical to every ‘soft state’, the NAO is very weak because it lacks independence and cannot 
prosecute suspects (AFRODAD, 2005:18). The general perception is that auditors have little 
independence from Controlling Officers. In this regard, the World Bank (2003b: vii) reported 
that “the independence of auditors to set their own program was lacking; and audit heads 
were reluctant to dwell in areas perceived as sensitive”. This lack of independence means 
that in most auditing exercises, “there is no compliance with plans, procedures, laws and 
regulations as stipulated in various guiding documents” (World Bank and IMF, 2004:37).  
 
Again as an element of a ‘soft state’, “there is poor enforcement of the Auditor General’s 
recommendations and the Government is unwilling to discipline officials” (Fozzard and 
Simwaka, 2002:47).  In this regard, there has been little follow up on audit reports and in 
most cases the Auditor General’s reports are ignored. Those responsible for irregularities are 
“rarely held accountable for their acts” (World Bank, 2003b:ix) and  “suspected corruptions 
in transactions have not been brought to conclusion” (World Bank, 2003b: 15). In this way, 
the “Auditor General’s effectiveness in enforcing accountability has been frustrated by the 
absence of disciplinary action, follow-up investigations and prosecution” (Durevall and 
Erlandsson, 2005:31).   
 
5.4.3.2.    THE MALAWI ANTI-CORRUPTION BUREAU 
 
Malawi has an anti-corruption watchdog, the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) whose duty is 
to arrest corruption. The ACB is a constitutional entity set up by the Corrupt Practices Act of 
1995 to investigate and prosecute offences of corruption, to educate on corruption, and to 
prevent corruption. It is headed by a Director. Despite its existence, “corruption is infesting 
the Malawi society, economy and polity with new velocity” (Khembo, 2005a:2).  
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The Anti Corruption Bureau has tried to investigate corruption in local assemblies within its 
present institutional and legal capacity.  Among the cases it has dealt with include those 
involving the Chairman of Mangochi Town Assembly and his Deputy; the Mayor of 
Lilongwe City Assembly and his Deputy; the Kasungu District Assembly Chairperson; and 
the Lilongwe City Assembly. However, just as in every ‘soft state’ these cases have not been 
brought to logical conclusion and no suspects have been arrested. In fact, “there are 
aggressive media and public attracts for the ACB’s lack of action” (Durevall and Erlandsson, 
2005: 32).  Unfortunately, the ACB is for the view that it “should not be judged by the 
number of people arrested for corruption and taken to court but for the number of corruption 
prevented as arrests and prosecutions are a sign of failure and weakness in the system” (ACB 
technical advisor, Paul Russell, quoted in the Nation, 4 December 2002). However, arrests 
are visible signs and measures of ant corruption institutions’ effective performance.   
Moreover, in Malawi, “prevention of corruption cannot be measured easily in quantitative 
terms, and therefore to measure the ACB against such bench marks may be tantamount to 
measuring them against nothing” (Khembo, 2005a: 2).  
 
It is generally perceived that the Anti-Corruption Bureau is limited by the current anti-
corruption legal framework. For instance, the Corrupt Practices Act of 1995 does not contain 
some categories of corruption, ‘fraud’ and ‘abuse of office’ for example, despite the fact that 
these are common and the ACB largely encounters them.  This makes the ACB unable to 
investigate such corrupt activities as they are seen not to be under its jurisdiction.  In this tune 
the Director of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Gustave Kaliwo, agrees that “investigations are 
not automatic” (Nation Online, 29th September 2004). In this arena, the Corrupt Practices Act 
of 1995 has been widely blamed as an “obstacle preventing the Anti-Corruption Bureau and 
its cooperating partners from effectively doing their job” (Khembo 2003:5). However, typical 
in every ‘soft state’ the Government has constantly refused to amend it.  
 
The efficiency and effectiveness of the Malawi Anti-Corruption Bureau is also greatly 
affected by unwarranted central political and administrative interference in the activities of 
the local assemblies.  In some instances the political elites have even protected some 
assembly officials who have been found to be corrupt. A case in point is where the Secretary 
for Local Government ordered to reinstate Kasungu District Assembly Chairperson when the 
Anti-Corruption Bureau suspended him on allegations that he diverted 1,200 pockets of 
starter pack (free seed meant for distribution) (The Nation 11 April 2003) to pave way for 
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investigations.  This interference and protection encourages corrupt tendencies in the 
assemblies. 
 
  
5.5. CONCLUSIONS AND DEDUCTIONS  
 
This chapter has presented research findings by looking at the current status in terms of 
political control and corruption in the light of NPM reforms in the Malawi’s local 
government system.  In this regard, the study has found that the NPM reforms implemented 
in the Malawian local Governance system have led to loss in local political control and 
corruption. The theme on loss of political control centred on four main NPM reform 
strategies namely, contracting out, managerial autonomy, performance management and 
public-private partnerships. The corruption theme concentrated on five NPM reform 
strategies namely: contracting out, user fees/cost recovery, managerial autonomy, 
decentralisation, and public-private partnerships. The study has further illustrated that the 
impact of the NPM on corruption in Malawi’s local government is boosted by the fact that 
Malawi is a ‘soft state’. In addition it has been seen that institutions of control, i.e. the 
National Audit Office and the Anti-Corruption Bureau do not adequately perform there 
duties to control corruption as is typical in a ‘soft state’.  
 
From these results we can draw a few deductions in relation to the two themes, political 
control and corruption.  Firstly, the loss of political control has serious implications on 
democratic governance. Elected representative are put in place to represent the people. This 
is the whole mark of the democratic philosophy. If peoples’ representatives feel that they are 
losing control and power, it implies the erosion of democratic values. This is the case as such 
powers are being taken over by the non-elected officials. In addition, the “political leaders 
are in the awkward position of retaining nominal responsibility for policies over which they 
have lost control” (Peters, 2004:132).  
 
Secondly NPM was championed for increased accountability, transparency, greater savings, 
efficiency and effectiveness. However, corruption frustrates the achievement of these ideals. 
Therefore the study deduces that NPM is self-defeating as it yields result that frustrates the 
attainment of its own intended goals.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
 
6.1       INTRODUCTION  
 
The current chapter presents recommendations and conclusions. It outlines recommendations 
that can be put in place to minimise the impacts of NPM on corruption and loss of local 
political control. It also concludes this thesis. It is organised into three main sections. The 
first section is this introduction and the second section provides recommendations.  The 
second section is further subdivided into recommendations pertaining to political control and 
recommendations directed towards addressing corruption. The last section concludes the 
study.    
 
6.2   RECOMMENDATIONS: A QUEST FOR THE PUBLIC GOVERNANCE 
            MODEL 
 
The study has found that the NPM paradigm has led to reduced political control and has 
provided more avenues for corruption in the Malawian local government. To mitigate the 
impact of the New Public Management on corruption and political control, the author 
suggests a shift to the Public Governance model discussed in chapter two. This is the case, as 
Public Governance “typifies public management in post-New Public Management (NPM)” 
(Schout and Jordan, 2005:107) that “challenges the language of the NPM and put governance 
on the agenda” (Rhodes, 2000: 347).   It acknowledges the limitations of the NPM model and 
emphasizes on the improvement of the “quality of cooperation and decision-making 
processes between government, social groups and stakeholders concerning matters of public 
interest” (Hill, cited in Bauer, 2004a: 14). The sections that follow justifiy why the public 
governance model will work to prevent the loss in political control caused by the NPM in the 
Malawian local government system. The first section discusses how the Public Governance 
model can reduce the loss of political control and the second looks at how the Public 
Governance paradigm can work to curb corruption in the context of the NPM.  
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6.2.1.  PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND LOSS OF LOCAL POLITICAL CONTROL  
 
It has been noted that a “series of political crises has meanwhile discredited the bright 
promises”… of the NPM… “as driving force of progress” (Mayntz, 2003:2).  To restore the 
lost local political control in Malawian local governance system, the study recommends the 
implementation of the Public Governance model. The Local Assemblies in Malawi should 
shift from the current management oriented NPM model to the Public Governance paradigm 
that takes into account all the contribution of all the stakeholders in a policy environment. 
The Public Governance paradigm “includes all relevant interests in the decision making 
process and balance these interests during negotiations” (Meyer and Baltes, 2004:32).  In this 
regard no actor feels losing power and control to other actors. In fact it is the political side 
that gains more power and control since the Public Governance model recognises the 
primacy of politics in the policy process.  This is the case as Public Governance refers to the 
institutions, processes and traditions that define: 
• How power is exercised, 
• How decisions are made and 
• How the views of the citizens are taken into account (Canada –Asean Governance 
Innovation Network, cited in Bauer, 2004a: 14), 
 
Public Governance is about the exercise of power. Michalski, Miller and Stevens (cited in 
Hill, Lynn, Proeller, and Schedler, 2005: 203) define Public Governance as the “general 
exercise of authority”.  In the Public Governance model this power, authority and control 
“concern more on mediating and coordinating intergovernmental policy making” (Klijn and 
Koppenjan, 2000).  In this regard, politicians being at the centre of the network, coordinate 
all the actors and activities thereby gaining power and control in the process. They are at the 
hub of decision-making process and they are instrumental in decisions on the way power is 
exercised and decisions are made. They are also representatives of the people providing a 
channel for popular participation. 
 
Moreover, Public Governance “is not an end result, but is said to be a process of joint policy-
making and implementation (Kooiman, in Schout and Jordan, 2005:107). It is in this tune 
that Rhodes (2000:356) stresses that with the Public Governance model, politicians “provide 
the policy framework and policy guidance, prod the network into action by systematic review 
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and scrutiny of its work, mobilise resources and skills across sectors, regulate the network 
and its members and provide advice and assistance”. In this regard, with the Public 
Governance model, politicians do not lose control and power but there is gain and a change 
in its form as politicians participating in the policy networks play a very special and 
privileged role (Mayntz, 2003:5). Consequently, it is the politician who gains a lot of power 
and control over the policy machinery in the Public Governance model.  
 
Moreover, the Public Governance model restores political control and power eroded by the 
NPM as it “repoliticizes the connection between the public institutions … in sharp contrast to 
the attempt made in the NPM model to achieve an air-tight separation of politics and 
operations. The purpose is not so much to eradicate politics in the implementing stages as it 
is to inhibit hierarchy …from undermining the more precise definition of objectives and the 
more substantive processes on the operative levels” (Bang, 2004: 170).  This 
‘repoliticization’ entails an increase in political power and control as politicians take a central 
role in all the phases of public policy.  This increasing role of politicians in the light of the 
Public Governance model is depicted in the table below:  
Table 6.1.  Increasing Political Control in The Public Governance   
 
PHASE OF POLICY  ROLE OF POLITICIAN  ASSEMBLY   DESIGN 
REQUIREMENT  
START (POLICY 
FORMULATION) 
Initiating and legitimizing:  
• Formulating substantive terms 
• Rules of the game for those 
involved (access to process) 
• Support for initiatives, clarifying 
status in decision making 
• Space for politicians to initiate 
and formulate terms 
• Commitment to rules of the 
game 
• Attune process design to involve 
politicians  
DURING (POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION) 
Actively involved and supportive: 
• Prevent exclusion of actors  
• Feedback to and adaptation of 
initial terms  
• Fosters confrontation of different 
ideas  
• Building-in feedback 
opportunities for administrators 
and politicians 
• Accepting possible adjustment of 
the interactive process 
• Realize mobilization of expertise 
and variety  
END (POLICY 
EVALUATION) 
Reconciling points of views and selecting 
alternatives: 
• Attempt to forge majorities in favor 
of proposal 
• Selection and policy combination 
of attractive policy proposal  
• Offering competitive alternatives 
• Open up possibilities for 
combining alternatives 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Klijn and Koppenjan, (2000: 384) 
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From table 6.1 above it can be seen that if the Malawian Local Assemblies implement the 
Public Governance model there can be an increase in the local political control. This is the 
case because unlike with the NPM, the role of politicians is not only limited to policy 
formulation but they are also actively involved in policy implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation. Moreover, the objective of the Public Governance model is “not to de-politicize 
the institutional operations, but rather, to make the political steering more precise …so that 
political steering of the public sector is tailored to the tasks of the individual institution” 
(Bang, 2004:171).   In addition, managerial autonomy no longer counts due to the 
multiplicity of actors involved in the policy process.  
 
However, for the Public Governance model to be effectively implemented, this study 
recommends that certain changes in the Malawian local assemblies’ organisation design have 
to be made. This is the case as the Local Assemblies were designed on the premise of the 
NPM rather than the Public Governance model. In this regard, as shown in Table 6.1 above, 
the organisational design has to provide room for political intervention, has to be committed 
to rules of the game, and attune itself to the realities of increased political commitment and 
involvement. In addition, there is need to build feedback opportunities for administrators and 
politicians, realise and mobilise experts, should offer competing alternatives and open up 
possibilities of combining alternatives.   These organisational design changes will enable the 
effective implementation of the Public Governance model in the Malawian Local 
Assemblies.  
 
 
6.2.2.   PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION    
 
This study has provided evidence that NPM reforms implemented in the Malawian local 
governance system have lead to increased levels of corruption. To curb corruption therefore, 
the study recommends the move from the NPM reforms to the Public Governance reforms. 
The Public Governance model will effectively address problems of corruption in the 
Malawian Local Assemblies as “disciplining agents is the central task of the public 
governance” (Frey, 2003:16).  
 
Moreover the Public Governance Paradigm has built in gadgets that “permit to process more 
information and take greater variety of values of into account” (Mayntz, 2003:2). These work 
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as mechanisms to fight against corruption and close all possible avenues for corruption.  
Cloete, (2000:24) and Bauer (2004a: 18-19) agree that these values include but not limited to 
the following: transparency, accountability, representivity, participation, equity, coherence 
and sustainability. In this regard, the Public Governance reforms are concerned with old 
values such as “equity, ethics, transparency and trust which go beyond the three “Es” of 
NPM (economy, efficiency and effectiveness)” (Bauer, 2004b: 6). This study narrows down 
to what Fuhr (2000:65) calls the “four key features” or “building blocks” of Public 
Governance. These include accountability, predictability, participation and transparency.  
The explanation of how these Public Governance values work to prevent corruption is 
provided in the sections that follow:   
 
6.2.2.1.   TRANSPARENCY 
Public Governance champions transparency in the running of public affairs. The introduction 
of interactive policy networks in the public sphere is to ensure increased transparency.  In 
this regard the Public Governance paradigm ensures that the administration and politicians 
and other network actors are held to the task of impartially and objectively administering 
rational operations in a transparent manner. In carrying out its functions and responsibilities, 
the authorities are to adopt a culture of openness and fairness. This openness is key to 
curbing corruption. Gildenhuys, (1997) observes that secrecy always entails hiding 
something and in most cases abuse of public resources. To this extent, Public Governance 
champions for the disclosure and sharing of information to all interested parties (Fuhr, 
2000:67).   
6.2.2.2 ACCOUNTABILITY  
 
Many authorities have directly connected the Public Governance model with Accountability. 
These authors have referred to Public Governance as the ‘implementation of systems of 
accountability and control” (Hill, Lynn, Proeller, and Schedler, 2005: 203)”. This means that 
accountability is at the “heart of (Public) Governance” (Fuhr, 2000:65).  Accountability 
entails responsibility for the quality of services, efficiency, sustainability etc. towards 
stakeholders.  
 
The Public Governance model introduces a network of actors who are mutually accountable 
for their actions. They have the responsibility to account to the network members and 
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citizens for the way in which public funds have been collected, kept safe and spent 
(Gildenhuys, 1997:36).   In this respect, instances of corruption are minimised due to the 
multiplicity of actors who check on the integrity of other network members. 
 
6.2.2.3. PARTICIPATION  
 
Public Governance entails the active participation of all parties in public policy and service 
delivery. It focuses on participative democracy (Schout and Jordan, 2005:107). However, 
extensive participation results in more trust and a culture of openness which is instrumental 
in curbing corruption. The active participation of all stakeholders in the policy process 
minimizes the risk of corruption in service delivery. From the earliest stages of policy 
identification, through to the formulation, design, implementation and evaluation of policy 
programs, stakeholders are centrality positioned to articulate needs, assist in devising policy 
plans, as well as evaluate end-results. This closes all possible avenues for corruption. In this 
arena the United Nations Association of Georgia (2000:1) agrees that “corruption is the 
social phenomenon and only through civil participation it can be solved”. Moreover 
participation is central for effective implementation of accountability and transparency.  
 
6.2.2.4.      PREDICTABILITY  
 
Predictability refers to the adherence of the rule of law. It encompasses “the laws and 
regulations, the processes through which they operate, and the institutions that apply them” 
(Fuhr, 2000:65). Public Governance is about the rule of laws.   Kooiman (cited in Hill, Lynn, 
Proeller, and Schedler, 2005: 203) stresses that Public Governance emphasises on rules and 
qualities of system, cooperation to enhance legitimacy and effectiveness.  
 
Strict adherence to the rules of the game is instrumental for curbing corruption. In Public 
Governance, all the network actors are bound by the set rules or codes of conduct that 
provide for acceptable ethical behaviour of its members.  This brings in predictability of what 
the required norms of network actors and instils a culture of openness and trusts which is 
central to the prevention of corruption. In the same regard, rules entail the formulation of 
disciplinary measures where those found guilty of corruption are publicised. This acts as a 
deterrent to financial misappropriation and diversion.  
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6.2.2.5.       ORGANIZATIONAL INTERVENTIONS    
 
For the Public Governance model building blocks to be entrenched in the Malawian Local 
Governance system the study recommends that some interventions to the organisational 
dynamics of the local assemblies.   These interventions include the following:  
• Increased political and administrative commitment to fight corruption 
 
• Intensified capacity building to govern so that local government network actors 
possess the necessary skills required for the effective network interaction. This means 
that all network members need to undergo a comprehensive education, training and 
awareness on Public Governance 
 
• Strengthen co-operation and collaboration between the assembly and all network 
members in the service delivery and fight against corruption 
 
• Engage on community level empowerment so that the community participates in all 
network activities so as to allow greater transparency and accountability 
 
• The need for a holistic and integrated approach to bring about Public Governance in 
Malawi’s local government 
 
• Strengthen the capacity, legal framework and independence of National Audit Office 
and the Anti-Corruption Bureau so that they can adequately carry out their mandates.   
 
• Adopt more proactive developmental policies and move away from the ‘soft state’ 
mindset.  
 
 
6.3.    CONCLUSIONS  
 
Public sector reforms are a key to the revival of the operations of the public sector and the 
delivery of quality public goods and services.  Central to public sector reform prescriptions 
are the New Public Management and Public Governance reforms. Because of its massive 
publicity, many countries have adopted the NPM stand. The NPM reforms have been 
paraded as a means to effective and efficient public service. However, not withstanding the 
promises for increased efficiency and effectiveness and economy, the NPM has had 
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undesirable consequences. The most notable ones include the loss in political control and 
corruption.  
  
Malawi began implementing the NPM related reforms in 1994 when it became a democracy. 
This study classifies them as second generation reforms in contrast to those administrative 
reforms that were implemented in the one party dictatorship era.  Some of these reforms 
included contracting out, performances management, privatisation, outcome based 
management and budgeting, user fees, decentralisation, public-private partnerships and 
managerial autonomy. They were first implemented at the central level and later they were 
extended to the decentralised structures. Several factors have been discussed as pressures for 
reform. They include socio-economic, political and administrative factors.   
 
This study has found out that the reforms prescribed in the New Public Management 
paradigm which were implemented at the local government level have led to reduced 
political power and control and have fostered corruption. In terms of political control, the 
study has found that local political leader in Malawi’s local government feel they are losing 
out their control and power to the assembly managers with the advent of the NPM reforms. 
In this regard, reform initiatives like contracting out, performance measurements, managerial 
autonomy and public-private partnerships erode local political control and power. On the 
other hand, the research has demonstrated that the reforms further entail wider avenues for 
corruption. In this respect, NPM reforms prescriptions like contracting out, managerial 
autonomy, decentralisation, user fees and public-private partnerships have only created 
opportunities for corruption, present motivations and possibilities for corruption.   
 
It is in this respect that the study recommends the replacement of the NPM with the Public 
Governance model to restore the lost political control and present measures to curb 
corruption in the Malawian local governance structures. The Public Governance model 
restores political control as it puts politicians at the centre of public policy. They are involved 
in all the policy stages with the important role of coordinating and mediating policy actors. 
This entails that they have overarching coordination power and control over public policy. 
This means increased political power and control. In the same manner, the Public 
Governance works to check corruption. This is the case as Public Governance is inherently 
ethically minded. It entails the institution of measures of accountability, transparency, 
participation and predictability that work to prevent corruption.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
 
INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEW GUIDE  
 
 
THEME 1:  NPM AND LOSS IN POLITICAL CONTROL  
 
 
A. For the Local Political Leaders  (Councillors) 
 
1. How do you judge your relationship with the management team?  
 
 
2. Does the assembly secretariat have some autonomy in carrying out their 
activities? 
 
3. Does the assembly secretariat unnecessarily leave you out of the picture in 
carrying implementation of service delivery? 
 
4. Does assembly secretariat unnecessarily interfere in policy formulation?  
 
 
5. Do you feel losing your political power and control to the assembly secretariat?  
 
6. If yes to what extent do the following contribute to the loss of that power and 
control:  
 
• Contracting out  
• Managerial autonomy  
• Outcome based management  
• Performance management 
• Public Private Partnerships 
 
 
7.  If yes what do you do to regain the political control and power 
 
 
B. For the Assembly Managers  
 
1. How do you judge your relationship with councillors?  
 
2. Do your primary roles include the following: 
• Policy making 
• Policy control 
• Policy implementation 
             
 
5. How often do you get in contact with the following groups:  
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• Councillors 
• Private organizations  
• Non Governmental Organisations  
• Citizens  
 
6. Do the councillors unnecessarily interfere in policy implementation? 
 
7. Do you have some managerial autonomy in carrying out your activities? 
 
8. Do you think councillors feel they are losing their power and control in the Assembly 
Activities because of such autonomy? 
 
9. If yes what extent do the following contribute to the loss of that power and control:  
 
• Contracting out  
• Managerial autonomy  
• Outcome based management  
• Performance management 
• Public Private Partnerships 
 
 
10. If yes what do you they do to regain the lost political power and control 
 
 
THEME 2: NPM AND CORRUPTION  
 
A) For Both Councillors and Assembly Managers  
 
a. Do any conditions exist in your Assembly that create opportunities for corruption   
 
b. Do you have any activities in the your Assembly that create motivations or incentives 
for corruption 
 
c. Do you have any activities in your Assembly that present possibilities for corruption  
 
d. To what extent do the following present possibilities, motivations and opportunities 
for corruption  
 
• Contracting out  
• Managerial autonomy 
• Outcome based management  
• Decentralisation 
• Public Private Partnership 
• User Fees/Cost Recovery    
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B    For Assembly Officials  
 
a. Do you feel that councillors indulge in activates that could be described as 
corruption? 
 
b. What are the examples of such activities 
 
c. Why do they engage in such activities? 
 
 
C    For Councillors  
 
a. Do you feel Assembly managers engage in activities that could be described as 
corruption? 
 
b. What are the examples of such activities 
 
c. Why do they engage in such activities? 
 87
